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ABSTRACT 
In its three decade history, the Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Englab Eslami, or Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps, evolved from the relatively modest role of ad hoc security 
apparatus into its current state as an independent and professional, armed force enmeshed 
in the political and economic life of modern Iran.  In tracing the history of the Guards, 
one cannot help but take note of how multiple rounds of U.S. sanctions have set the stage 
for this transformation.  Sanctions imposed under the Carter and Reagan administrations 
created a defense gap by first severing ties between the Iranian and U.S. defense 
industries and then choking the flow of U.S. war materiel through intermediaries.  The 
Guards, buoyed by their connection to Iranian defense conglomerate DIO, rose with the 
tide of domestic wartime spending; emerging from the Iran-Iraq War with a considerable 
construction and manufacturing base.  The Guards were then able to leverage this base to 
dominate postwar reconstruction in Iran, spurred by a gap in foreign development activity 
exacerbated by the Clinton era sanctions.  Today, smart sanctions appear to continue this 
trend by the creation of a finance gap that is tilting the ongoing privatization of Iran’s 
burgeoning public sector squarely in favor of the Guards. 
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I. THESIS INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The scope of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, Pasdaran, in Iranian 
political, social, and economic life has undergone periods of stagnation and rapid 
expansion since the organization’s inception in 1979.1  The focus of this thesis is 
unraveling the role of sanctions in shifting the balance of power between the Pasdaran 
and the traditional source of power in the Iranian theocracy the Iranian clergy, or ulama.  
To adequately explore this issue requires charting the history of the IRGC and identifying 
pertinent social, political, and economic factors that contributed to an increase in power.   
The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether the imposition of sanctions has 
created more fertile domestic economic conditions that could later be exploited by the 
IRGC.  If the linkage between sanctions and economic opportunity can be substantiated, 
then the case must be made that the broadening of the Pasdaran’s economic base has 
translated into political power gains within the Iranian regime.  In addition to economic 
conditions, this thesis may explore whether the imposition of sanctions has created social 
or political conditions in Iran, which favors militarization.   
B. JUSTIFICATION  
The Islamic Republic of Iran presents significant opportunities and challenges for 
the United States due to its status as a key regional actor within the Middle East and an 
important global supplier of natural resources.  The considerable size of the Iranian state, 
population, and security forces combined with the geostrategic significance of the Iranian 
coastline (Persian Gulf and Straits of Hormuz) elevate Iran to the top of the list of 
powerful and potentially disruptive regional actors.  This disruptive potential is 
exacerbated by the unique political character of the Islamic Republic.  Iran’s role as a 
                                                 
1 For purposes of disambiguation, contemporary sources refer to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps as the Pasdaran, or Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Englab Eslami, the Guards, or the Corps; they will be 
referred to hereafter as the Pasdaran, IRGC or the Guards.   
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Shi’a-ruled, Persian pariah and constitutionally-mandated exporter of Islamic 
revolutionary sentiment complicates relationships between Iran and its secular and/or 
monarchical neighbors.2  Of particular regional interest to the United States is the history 
of Iranian interference in both the Iraqi (OIF) and Afghan (OEF) theaters of operations 
and Iran’s continuing role as a state sponsor of terrorist organizations (the Quds Force (a 
branch of the IRGC), Hezbollah, and Hamas).3 
In addition to exerting considerable regional influence, Iran remains an important 
trading partner to many countries due to its considerable natural resource endowments.  
An abundance of hydrocarbon resources, in particular, ensures that the Islamic Republic 
will remain an indispensible supplier to world energy markets.  Iran is the second largest 
producer of crude oil in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and ranks 
third in the world in terms of proven oil reserves (second barring Canadian 
unconventional oil sources) and second in the world for natural gas reserves.4  
The indelible presence of Iran in regional and global security matters makes 
understanding the ramifications of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis Iran an issue of particular 
interest to the United States.  To reach an understanding of U.S.-Iranian relations 
necessitates an understanding of the effects of sanctions.  A brief overview of the 31 year 
history between the two states reveals that unilateral and multilateral sanctions against the 
government of Iran is the preferred response to Iranian aggression and defiance of U.S. 





                                                 
2 Irano-British Chamber of Commerce, The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, March 1, 
2004, Article 2, http://www.ibchamber.org/lawreg/constitution.htm (accessed July 7, 2010). 
3 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2008-Chapter 3: 
State Sponsors of Terrorism,” U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2009, 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2008/122436.htm (accessed July 20, 2010). 
4 CIA World Fact Book, Country Comparisons: Oil - Proved Reserves, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2178rank.html 01 January, 2010. 
(accessed 14 July, 2010); U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Country Analysis Brief: Iran: 
Natural Gas, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Iran/NaturalGas.html, January 2010. (accessed 14 July, 2010). 
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Order 12170, on November 14, 1979 and the broadening of U.S. sanctions in response to 
UNSCR 1929 on June 9, 2010, the United States amassed a ledger of over 40 sanctions-
related laws and regulations.5   
The heavy reliance on political and economic sanctions as a tool of American 
diplomacy demands a greater understanding of the peripheral effects.  Included in this 
group of these effects is the relationship between these sanctions and the gradual 
militarization of the Iranian government.  Therefore, a clear understanding of this 
relationship is necessary to accurately represent the tradeoffs associated with the pursuit 
of a particular policy and to more precisely determine the calculus of U.S.-Iranian foreign 
policy.   
In summary, this thesis warrants examination due to both the importance of the 
subject and the prevalence of the focus.  Iran is a country at the nexus of Middle Eastern 
and global relationships and intrigues.  This approach to studying Iran, the role of 
sanctions in the militarization of Iran, addresses a diplomatic issue that is both relevant, 
given the sheer volume of sanctions introduced over the last three decades, and 
contemporary, given the current round of sanctions being discussed and implemented as 
of the writing of this thesis. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The factious circles of formal and informal power within the Islamic Republic of 
Iran make information a tightly-controlled commodity.  The primary obstacle in 
preparing this thesis was penetrating the veil of opacity that shrouds IRGC operations 
and, more generally, the social, economic, and political life of Iran.  Accepting North 
Korea, few countries represent a greater challenge than Iran for gathering accurate 
political, social, and economic data.  Addressing this problem required tracing the 
                                                 
5 Jimmy Carter, “Executive Order 12170 Blocking Iranian Government Property,” The [U.S.] National 
Archives: The Federal Register, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-
order/12170.html (accessed July 20, 2010); UN News Centre, “Citing Iran’s failure to clarify nuclear 
ambitions, UN imposes additional sanctions,” United Nations News Centre, June 9, 2010, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=34970&Cr=iran&Cr1 (accessed July 6, 2010); United 
States Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Asset Control: Iran Sanctions, June 16, 2010, 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/iran/iran.shtml (accessed July 07, 2010). 
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activities of organizations later tied to the IRGC, assembling myriad sources that only 
touch the thesis subject tangentially, and incorporating some speculative assertions from 
Iranian insiders.  
The material gathered to produce this thesis points toward a linkage between the 
levying of sanctions and the expansion of the IRGC into the Iranian economy.  This 
thesis will attempt to show that sanctions have created a unique set of social, political, 
and economic conditions within Iran and that these conditions favor the success of the 
IRGC over its domestic and foreign competitors.  The mechanisms for the creation of 
these conditions are included in the following hypotheses.  
1. HYPOTHESIS #1 Sanctions Created a Military-Industrial Gap in 
Iran on What the IRGC Would Capitalize 
One of the potential mechanisms responsible for contributing to the success of the 
IRGC over its nonstate competitors is an early connection to the Iranian military 
industrial complex.  Sanctions prohibiting the sale of arms to Iran diverted Iranian 
wartime spending away from its previous outfitter, American and British defense 
manufacturers, in favor of the construction of a domestic manufacturing infrastructure.   
2. HYPOTHESIS #2 Sanctions Allow IRGC to Capitalize on Identity as 
Guardians of Islamic Revolution  
Another hypothesis explored in this thesis is that sanctions strengthened the 
ideological divide between Iran and the United States.  Any punitive action taken by the 
United States against the Islamic Republic can be presented to the Iranian domestic 
audience as an attack against Iranian theocracy or more broadly as an attack against 
Islam.  Understanding that while the citizens of Iran may hold conflicting views on the 
 5
individual powerbrokers in the Iranian government, polling results show that the majority 
of Iranian citizens still approve of their system of government.6 
3. HYPOTHESIS #3 Sanction Effects on Private Enterprise Are Greater 
Than Sanction Effects on IRGC  
One of the potential mechanisms responsible for contributing to the success of the 
IRGC over its nonstate competitors is that the sanctions regimes placed a 
disproportionate economic pressure on Iranian private enterprise by limiting access to 
industrial inputs.  The IRGC, through its relationship with the government and its role in 
the provision of internal security, is able to alleviate some of these negative effects of 
these sanctions.7  As sanctions constrain the legitimate channels for goods and materials 
flow of goods and materials into the Iran, businesses aligned with the IRGC have access 
to smuggling channels that is unparalleled by their competitors in the private sector.8 
4. HYPOTHESIS #4 Sanctions Increase Risk Exposure That Inhibits 
Foreign Competition  
The final hypothesis on the effect of sanctions on Iranian militarization is that the 
increasing employment of targeted sanctions against businesses and individuals involved 
in Iran raised the economic and political risks associated with doing business in Iran.9  
Elevating risks discourages more risk-averse American, European, and Asian companies 
                                                 
6 Stephen Kull, “Is Iran Pre-revolutionary?,” World Public Opinion.org., November 23, 2009. 
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/651.php?lb=brme&pnt=651&nid=
&id= (accessed August 15, 2010). and Kull, Stephen, Clay Ramsay, Stephen Weber, and Evan Lewis. “An 
Analysis of Multiple Polls of the Iranian Public.” World Public Opinion.org., February 3, 2010, 
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/feb10/IranElection_Feb10_rpt.pdf (accessed August 15, 
2010). 
7 The concept of IRGC monopoly in smuggling goods is discussed briefly in the article: The 
Economist, “International: Showing Who’s Boss: Iran's Revolutionary Gurads,” The Economist, August 29, 
2009. 
8 The role of the IRGC and UAE in smuggling goods into Iran is discussed in the article in the 
Economist. “Sanctions on Iran: Anything to Declare?" The Economist. July 1, 2010. 
http://www.economist.com/node/16483587 (accessed July 11, 2010). 
9 The concept of risk elevation and its effect on Iranian trade is introduced in: Jafari, Omeed. “IRGC, 
Inc.,” AEI: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, May 17, 2007, 
http://www.aei.org/article/26194 (accessed July 11, 2010). 
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from competing for lucrative construction and engineering contracts.10  Limitation and 
elimination of foreign competition from the Iranian economy shifts the demand to fulfill 
these contracts inward.  In turn, the IRGC is ideally positioned to capture the domestic 
market through leverage of its network of businesses including the Khatam-ol-Anbia, or 
Ghorb, the Pasdaran equivalent to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.11  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The study of Iran, in general, is experiencing a resurgence of attention as of the 
writing of this proposal.  Controversy surrounding the 2009 re-election of Iranian 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the emergence of a grassroots opposition movement, 
and the ongoing nuclear crisis have all thrust the Islamic Republic back into the 
international spotlight.  Hence, the focus of this new body of literature is directed 
primarily toward the more recent expansion of the Pasdaran power base under 
Ahmadinejad or toward a broader discussion of the efficacy of sanctions with respect to 
the achievement of political goals, specifically discouraging the Iranian nuclear 
program.12  Narrowing the focus of research to the expansion of the Pasdaran after the 
2005 Iranian elections offers an expedient solution due to the number of high profile 
engineering contracts awarded to IRGC affiliates (Phases 15 & 16 of development for 
South Pars gas field, Tehran Metro contract, hydroelectric dam tenders in West 
                                                 
10 The following articles explore the notion that sanctions are stifling foreign competition in the 
Iranian economy. Will Hadfield, “Privatisation Plan Stalls” [cover story], MEED: Middle East Economic 
Digest, November 2, 2007: 5; Der Speigel. “German Businesses Gradually Withdrawing From Iran,” Der 
Spiegel-International, June 11, 2010, 
https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display
/EUP20100614072001#index=1&searchKey=360002&rpp=10 (accessed July 14, 2010); Ralf Beste, 
Christoph Pauly, and Christian Reiermann, “Twisting Arms: U.S. Pressures Germany to Cut Iran Business 
Ties,” Der Spiegel Online: International. July 30, 2007. 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,497319,00.html (accessed July 26, 2010); Open 
Source Center. “Highlights: Iran Economic Sanctions, Government Corruption 13–19 Sep 07;” Open 
Source Center. September 19, 2007. 
https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display
/IAP20070924306002 (accessed July 14, 2010). and Mark Dubowitz, “Argument: The Sanctions on Iran 
Are Working,” Foreign Policy, February 10, 2010. 
11 Jafari, “IRGC, Inc.”  
12 For a good overview of nuclear sanctions see: Brenden Taylor, Sanctions as Grand Strategy. 
London: Routledge, 2010: 60–100 and UN News Centre, “Citing Iran’s Failure to Clarify Nuclear 
Ambitions.” 
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Azarbaijan, Kordestan, Kermanshah, Ilam, Lorestan, and Khuzestan) and the large 
number of new government appointees with a strong association to IRGC.13 However, 
the Pasdaran did not spring into existence in 2005, readymade to shape the Iranian 
political-economy.  Understanding the role sanctions in the militarization of Iran requires 
understanding the events and relationships that led up to the current explosion of IRGC 
influence. 
The roots of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps trace all the way back to the 
1979 Revolution.  The newly established regime recognized the contribution of the IRGC 
in achieving the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty and the subsequent establishment of 
the new Iranian Constitution (adopted October 24, 1979).  Article 150 formally enshrined 
the distinction between the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps from the roles 
of the other Iranian security forces [the regular military (Artesh) and the Law 
Enforcement Force (LEF)].  
Article 150: The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, organized in the early 
days of the triumph of the Revolution, is to be maintained so that it may 
continue in its role of guarding the Revolution and its achievements. The 
scope of the duties of this Corps, and its areas of responsibility, in relation 
to the duties and areas of responsibility of the other armed forces, are to 
be determined by law, with emphasis on brotherly cooperation and 
harmony among them.14 
The ousting of U.S.-friendly monarch, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, generated 
animosity at the outset between the United States and Iran’s fledging provisional 
government.  Friction came to a head on November 4, 1979 when a group of students 
calling themselves the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam’s Line stormed the 
                                                 
13 High-profile IRGC contracts are discussed at length in many of the references cited but are most 
comprehensively represented in the fifth chapter of: FredricWehrey, Jerrold D. Green, Brian Nichiporuk, 
Alireza Nader, Lydia Hansell, Rasool Nafisi, and S. R. Bohandy, The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the 
Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
2009); IRGC political expansion in the 2000s is summarized in: David E. Thaler, Alireza Nader, Shahram 
Chubin, Jerrold D. Green, Charlotte Lynch, and Frederic Wehrey, Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), 58–64. 
14 Irano-British Chamber of Commerce, The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.  
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American Embassy in Tehran, taking 63 hostages.15  President Carter responded in the 
six months that followed the takeover by issuing three punitive Executive Orders against 
Iran; 12170, 12205, and 12211.  These sanctions effectively froze all Iranian assets within 
the United States and restricted practically every nonhumanitarian aid-based transaction 
between U.S. and Iranian actors.16  These initial rounds of sanctions worked in concert 
with the anti-West rhetoric emanating from the leadership of the new Islamic regime to 
draw a line between Iran and a large percentage of the industrialized world.  This new 
paradigm of isolation from the West shifted the focus of the economic activity away from 
the programs of modernization and integration into global manufacturing chains 
developed during the Pahlavi dynasty and toward an agenda of industrial self-reliance.17   
The United States enacted the next iteration of sanctions in the midst of the Iran-
Iraq War.  The writing of the Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Khomeini suggests the 
embargo against Iran as the impetus for this transition from dependence on foreign 
manufacturing.  
Those of us who seemed to be unable to make or repair anything after the 
economic blockade was forced on us were impelled to use our minds and brains and 
succeeded in manufacturing a good many things-that met the needs of the army and the 
manufacturing plants.18 
Conversely, with regard to Iranian defense manufacturing in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, A.T. Shulz comments, “For the indefinite future, Iran’s arms production will 
                                                 
15 Jimmy Carter Library & Museum. “The Hostages and The Casualties.” Jimmy Carter Library & 
Museum. July 5, 2005. http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/list_of_hostages.phtml (accessed 
July 28, 2010). 
16 All relevant Executive Orders can be found at: United States Department of the Treasury. Office of 
Foreign Asset Control: Iran Sanctions. For the convenience of the reader, a comprehensive overview of all 
U.S.-Iranian sanctions legislation will be included as an appendix in the thesis.  
17 Mohsen M. Milani, The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 
1988), 105–129. 
18 Ruhullah Khomeini, “IRNA The Last Message: The Political and Divine Will of His Holiness 
Imam Khomeni (S.A) Last Will and Testament of Imam Khomeini” [translated from Farsi]. 
http://server32.irna.com/occasion/ertehal/english/will/lmnew6.htm (accessed July 19, 2010). 
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continue to depend on foreign support far more than on domestic policy.”19  Regardless 
of the degree of success the republic enjoyed in extricating Iranian defense from its 
dependency on foreign sources, during the Iran-Iraq War the government directed a large 
flow of money towards the defense manufacturing sector as wartime defense spending 
jumped to nearly 17 percent of Iranian GDP.20  
An early linkage between the Pasdaran and the Iranian defense industry set the 
stage for self-sufficiency and expansion into the economy.21  Gains made in the 
Pasdaran manufacturing base during the war enabled the Guards to answer the call after 
the last shots were fired to openly enter into the Iranian economy.  Many Iranian analysts 
point to this period as the watershed moment for the coming of age of the IRGC.22   
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the name of the game in Iran was 
reconstruction.  Eight years of hostilities left infrastructure in the key energy sector in 
disarray and subsequent hydrocarbon revenues at an all-time low (despite record high oil 
prices).23  Compounding the issue, veterans from the Iran-Iraq War returned from the 
front lines to a bleak economic scene complete with an unemployment rate that had not 
retreated substantially from the 1987 peak of nearly 50 percent.24  The government’s 
solution to absorb labor excess and prompt reconstruction efforts was to expand the role 
of government institutions into the economy.25  The most significant Pasdaran response 
to this invitation was the foundation of the engineering headquarters Gharargah 
Sazandegi Khatam al-Anbia, more commonly known by its abbreviation Ghorb or 
                                                 
19 A. T. Schulz, “Iran: An Enclave Arms Industry,” in Arms Production in the Third World, eds. 
Michael Brzoska, and Thomas Ohlson, 147–59 (Philadelphia: Taylor & Francis, 1986), 159. 
20 R. Verma, E. Wilson, and M. Pahlavani, “The Role of Capital Formation and Saving in Promoting 
Economic Growth in Iran,” The Middle East Business and Economic Review, June 2007: 10. 
21 Ali Alfoneh, “How Intertwined Are the Revolutionary Guards in Iran’s Economy,” American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, October 2007, http://www.aei.org/outlook/26991 (accessed 
July 20, 2010): 3. 
22 Alfoneh, “How Intertwined Are the Revolutionary Guards in Iran’s Economy.” 
23 Ervand Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
175. 
24 Efraim Karsh, Essential Histories: The Iran-Iraq War 1980–1988 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 
2002), 86. 
25 Wehrey et al., The Rise of the Pasdaran, 57. 
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truncated form Khatam al-Anbia.26  Ghorb has since grown over two decades into the one 
of the largest entities operating in the domestic Iranian economy.27 
As President Rafsanjani and his reformers opened the doors to the Iranian 
economy to state institutions, the United States launched an effort to close those doors; 
first to American investment and then to the rest of the industrialized world.  In 1995, the 
Clinton Administration sought to curb Iranian interest in weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) by issuing two Executive Orders.  E.O. 12957 and 12959 banned, respectively, 
U.S. investment in the Iranian energy sector and U.S. trade and investment in Iran.28  The 
following year, the U.S. Congress signed into law P.L. 104-172, more commonly known 
as the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA).  ILSA broke ranks with previous generations of 
U.S. sanctions by threatening to levy a tailored U.S. response (from a list of secondary 
sanctions) on foreign companies involved in Iranian energy investment.29  The secondary 
sanctions aspect of ILSA motivated the European Union to lodge a formal complaint 
against the United States with the World Trade Organization.30  Despite the strength of 
ILSA’s legal structure, the actual impact of the law has been relatively light.  Political 
maneuvering between the European Union and the Clinton and Bush Administrations 
reduced the likelihood that ILSA will ever be enforced.31  
The first ten years of the new millennium were witness to unprecedented political 
and economic gains for the Pasdaran.  IRGC representation expanded first in the 
municipal elections in 2003, then in parliamentary elections in 2004, and finally the 
presidency in 2005.  Since election, President Ahmadinejad has proven so critical to 
consolidating IRGC gains that one Iranian newspaper, E'temad Melli, acerbically 
proclaimed GHORB the real winner of the 2005 presidential elections.32   
                                                 
26 Wehrey et al., The Rise of the Pasdaran, 59–60. 
27 Thaler et al., Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads, 59. 
28 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Asset Control.   
29 Kenneth Katzman, The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) RS2071, Economic analysis, (Washington 
D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2006): 2–3. 
30 Jahangir Amuzegar, “Adjusting to Sanctions,” Foreign Affairs (May–June 1997): 36. 
31 Katzman, The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, 4-5. 
32 Alfoneh, “How Intertwined Are the Revolutionary Guards in Iran’s Economy.” 
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After 2000, U.S. interest in deterring Iran and the IRGC has risen in parallel with 
IRGC status.  The post-9/11 Bush Administration focused Iranian foreign policy efforts 
towards deterrence of WMD proliferation.  Executive Order 13382, issued 25 October 
2007, identified several of the Pasdaran’s major financial and commercial interests, 
prohibiting transactions between these entities and U.S. persons and freezing any assets 
held within the United States.  This Order marked the first occasion that the United States 
targeted a foreign military with sanctions.33   
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
As the focus of this thesis is narrow, the effect of an evolving body of sanctions 
on the militarization of a government, the methodology best suited for this thesis is the 
single case study.  The body of this thesis will employ a format similar to that of the 
literature review, incorporating a historic narrative with supporting economic data and 
analysis.  The desired end state is the construction of a timeline that details the expansion 
of the IRGC into the both the licit and illicit sectors of the Iranian economy and provides 
a rigorous analysis of the interplay of the sanctions regime within that timeline.  
Following the temporal presentation of the material, the conclusion will consolidate the 
high points thematically into three separate gaps.  While these gaps roughly correlate to 
the time periods delineated in the three main chapters, the gaps’ contributions towards the 
militarization of Iran frequently overlap and cannot be so rigidly ascribed. 
As might be expected, given the limitations on economic data volunteered by 
Iran, the body of formal literature dedicated to the post-Revolution Iranian economy is, at 
best, limited.  Further complicating the matter, the Pasdaran are accountable only to the 
Supreme Leader and, as such, are unfettered by the paper trail normally generated 
through parliamentary oversight.34  Fortunately, the scope of IRGC economic activity has 
grown too large to evade outside attention and chronicling this activity is beginning to 
gain some traction.  The Middle East Economic Digest is a good source for articles 
                                                 
33 Illias Shayera, Iran's Economic Conditions: U.S. Policy Issues (RL34525) (Washington D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, 2010), 9. 
34 Kim Murphy, “Iran’s $12-Billion Enforcers: From Road-Building to Laser Eye Surgery, the 
Revolutionary Guard Dominates the Economy,” Los Angeles Times, August 26, 2007: A1. 
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detailing major economic movement by the IRGC and IRGC-affiliated actors.  Similarly, 
public policy think-tanks are coming into the arena of Iranian study.  RAND and the 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI) have diligently generated 
reports, conferences, and monographs that penetrate deeper than most popular media 
treatment of the subject.  Additional data for a more broad analysis of the Iranian 
economy is available from the statistical bellwethers, the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization. 
The principal source for data detailing the history of U.S.-Iranian sanctions is the 
U.S. Treasury Department.  The Office of Foreign Assets Control section of the Treasury 
Department website provides a comprehensive look at the legal framework for Iranian 
sanctions and includes all pertinent Executive Orders, U.S. Statutes, U.S. Codes of 
Federal Regulations, and Federal Register Notices.35  This convenient grouping of 
primary sources enables and simplifies piecing together the timeline and scope of the last 
31 years of U.S. sanctions.  In addition, the Treasury Department website maintains an 
archive of official press releases.  These releases offer valuable insight and context for 
each of the individual sanction programs, to include the underlying rationale and desired 
end-state.    
F. FORMAT AND OVERVIEW 
This thesis observes the standard convention of five chapter delineation to 
include: an introductory chapter, three chapters of research and analysis, and a 
concluding chapter.  The three chapters that follow are dedicated to research and analysis 
of three consecutive time periods and chart the status of the sanctions regime against the 
growth of the Pasdaran.  These chapters flow in a chronological order beginning at the 
founding of the Islamic Republic and continuing to the present.  Chapters II covers the 
period from 1979 until the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988.  Chapter III covers post-war 
reconstruction up to the presidential election of former IRGC commander, Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad on July 24, 2005.  Chapter IV covers the remaining five years, bringing this 
analysis up to the present nuclear crisis.  Chapter V serves as the conclusion and 
                                                 
35 United States Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Asset Control. 
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concisely reiterates the primary results of the thesis with an emphasis on future 
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II. REVOLUTIONARIES TO REFORMERS (1979–1988) 
A. REVOLUTIONARY SEED: THE ORIGIN OF THE IRGC 
Following the overthrow of Shah Pahlavi in February 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini 
consolidated the partisan militias into the Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Englab Eslami. Initially, 
the Guards served as a foil to potentially volatile remnants of the Shah’s professional 
armed forces; those that had not already been purged, imprisoned, or simply disappeared 
into the churning revolutionary masses.36  The intentions guiding this ideologically-
driven security force, however, extended far beyond providing a simple counterbalance to 
the remaining conventional forces.     
Khomeini rightfully sensed both danger and opportunity in the absence of a 
unified purpose in the amalgam of dissatisfied and disenfranchised parties fueling 
revolutionary Iran.  The Communist Tudeh Party, the bazaari merchant class, landed 
tribal chiefs, and rural notables represent just a few of the competing interests at work in 
the state during the Revolution.37  This threat was not limited strictly ideological terms as 
many of these organizations brandished their own supporting paramilitary forces.  In 
order to weave the various strands of the revolution into an Islamic context Khomeini 
required the support of a powerful backer; the IRGC was groomed to fill this role.  
Consequently, when Khomeini’s first representative to the IRGC, Ayatollah Hassan 
Lahouti Eshkevari, attempted to subordinate the IRGC to the provisional government in 
lieu of Khomeini’s Council of the Islamic Revolution, Khomeini had Eshkevari 
dismissed and later imprisoned and executed.38  Hence, the primary role of the Pasdaran 
was advancing Khomeini’s Islamic revolutionary agenda amidst the torrent of competing 
interests.  Emphasis on this particular loyalty to the Islamic revolution is evident in the 
                                                 
36 Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (New York: Holt 
Paperbacks, 2006), 19. 
37 Abrahamian. A History of Modern Iran. 156–62. 
38 Ali Alfoneh, “Changing of the Guards: Iran’s Supreme.” American Enterprise Institute of Public 
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two primary documents that serve as the framework of the Revolutionary Guards Corps, 
the Asasnameh-ye Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami (Statute of the Revolutionary 
Guards Corps) and the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.39 
Article 150: The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, organized in the early 
days of the triumph of the Revolution, is to be maintained so that it may 
continue in its role of guarding the Revolution and its achievements. The 
scope of the duties of this Corps, and its areas of responsibility, in relation 
to the duties and areas of responsibility of the other armed forces, are to 
be determined by law, with emphasis on brotherly cooperation and 
harmony among them.40 
As the dialectic between Iran and the West unfolded from the 1980s through the 
present, this unique Pasdaran identity as guardians of the Islamic Revolution and its 
resonance with conservative elements of government would generate large amounts of 
social, economic, and political capital for the Guards.   
B. INTRODUCTION TO INDUSTRY: IRGC AND THE IRANIAN 
MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 
The post-revolution metamorphosis of the Iranian defense industry is not an 
account of the eradication free-wheeling Schumpeterian entrepreneurs in favor of 
Pasdaran management; nor does it represent simply a change of letterhead from one 
state-based administrator to another, the character of this transformation lies somewhere 
in the middle of these two extremes.41  Iranian military industrialization did not graduate 
from relatively modest production (munitions, expendables, kit assembly, etc.) until the 
early 1970s.  Shah Pahlavi, alarmed by Soviet geostrategic maneuvering in Iraq on the 
west and India to the east, dedicated an increasing share of the rising Iranian oil receipts 
towards acquisition and the indigenous development of modern weaponry.42  The Shah 
                                                 
39 A copy of the Asasnameh-ye Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami [in Farsi] can be obtained 
through the Iranian parliamentary website: http://tarh.majlis.ir/?ShowRule&Rid=1D4973FB-9551-4F8D-
AEB3-DAEFD52791F1 (accessed July 20, 2010). 
40 Irano-British Chamber of Commerce, The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.  
41 Joseph Alois Schumpeter, an Austrian economist, championed the role of the entrepreneur as the 
motive force behind the success of capitalism.  More information on Schumpeter can be found at: 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Schumpeter.html (accessed 28 July, 2010).  
42 Schulz, “Iran: An Enclave Arms Industry,” 148–9.  
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included an ambitious modernization program for Iran’s defense manufacturing sector in 
his Third, Fourth and Fifth National Development Plans (1963–1978).  This aggressive 
push for modernization resulted in nearly a seven-fold increase in defense expenditure 
between 1966 and 1973.43   
Modernization under the Shah involved collaboration with over a dozen American 
and European arms manufacturers; including major U.S. contractors Northrop, 
Grumman, Lockheed, Westinghouse, and Emerson.44  Joint ventures with these defense 
industrial behemoths spawned the Iranian-based aircraft manufacturers, Iran Aircraft 
Industries (IACI) and Iran Helicopter Industries (IHI); research and development 
manufacturers, Iran Electronics Industries (IEI) and Iran Advanced Technology 
Corporation (IATC); and the telecommunications manufacturer, National 
Telecommunications System.45  The Ministry of War managed the Iranian sides of these 
cooperative ventures under the umbrella corporation the Military Industries Organization 
(MIO).  Therefore, while it is not accurate to label the defense industry under the Shah as 
privatized free enterprise, one can characterize the relationship as a generally transparent 
association between state-backed Iranian businesses and Western private defense 
corporations.  However, this relative openness in the defense industry would not long 
survive the internal reshuffling occurring within the state as a result of the Revolution. 
On the coattails of the founding of the Islamic Republic in December 1979, 
Khomeini wedded his ideological security apparatus, the Pasdaran, with the fragmented 
remains of the Military Industries Organization.  However, this handoff of MIO to the 
IRGC was not the only, or even most significant, change to the state’s military-industrial 
conglomerate during this period.  Newly redubbed as the Defense Industries Organization 
(DIO), the conglomerate emerged from the Revolution without the benefit of its previous 
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partnership with the West.46 Executive Order 12205, issued by U.S. President Jimmy 
Carter in response to the ongoing hostage crisis, made such partnerships with Iran illegal 
by prohibiting American companies from participating in Iranian industry and cutting off 
direct Iranian access to American-made goods.47  Over the course of the following 
decade this loss of access to the American goods would produce some severe 
repercussions for Iran.  As Khomeini attempted to march Iran through Baghdad down the 
“Road to Jerusalem,” shortfalls in the supply of foreign-sourced war materiel would 
beleaguer Iranian war efforts, reinforce Iranian inwardness and strengthen the position of 
the Guards.48 
C. EIGHT YEARS IN ECONOMIC ABYSS: THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR 
The origin of the Iran-Iraq War is an area of popular dispute.  Iranian interference 
in Iraqi domestic politics is likely one contributing factor.  Another probable piece of the 
puzzle is rooted in the border dispute between Iraq and Iran.  Iraqi people generally 
viewed Iraq’s loss of control over the entirety of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, partially 
ceded to Iran in the 1975 Algiers Agreement, as a particularly humiliating concession.49  
Iraqi abrogation from the Algiers Agreement preceded invasion by a mere six days and is 
considered by some as the Iraqi declaration of war.50  Finally, the diplomatic isolation of 
post-revolutionary Iran from the United States, the primary source for Iranian advanced 
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to attack.  This vulnerability in Iranian regional prominence offered Iraq the opportunity 
to ascend in terms of terms of national and regional prestige and assume a leadership role 
in the post-Arab nationalism regional order.51   
Efraim Karsh argues that the principle reason behind Iran drawing out the Iran-
Iraq War was that the conflict provided an opportunity to consolidate the Iranian 
Revolution into a solidly theocratic movement.52  Violation of Iranian territorial 
sovereignty by secular Iraq offered an ideal opponent against which to stress the Shi’a 
Islamic aspect of the Iranian identity.  Supporting the war against Iraq became a national 
and religious endeavor.  Furthermore, austerity measures adopted by the government to 
fund the war evoked a sense of shared sacrifice among the Iranian populace.53  Perhaps, 
nowhere else in Iran was this concept of sacrifice displayed more conspicuously than in 
the ranks of Iran’s ideological soldiers, the Pasdaran and the Basij.   
The duality of Ayatollah Khomeini’s power, his religious and political authority, 
allowed the cleric to equate the death of a partisan soldier with a paradise-warranting act 
of martyrdom.  During the war, Iran adopted a strategy of using superior numbers 
(fielding soldiers at a ratio of approximately three to one) to offset Iraq’s considerable 
materiel advantage.  Hence, the Iranian front generated wave upon wave of poorly trained 
young men and boys armed with little more than Khomeini’s plastic key to Paradise.54  
One important outcome from these suicidal campaigns against the Iraqi war machine was 
that it cemented public perception of the Pasdaran and the Basij as the de facto guardians 
of the state.  Popular recognition, however, came with the price of a tremendous death 
toll and represented just one of the exorbitant costs of the “imposed” war. 
The tremendous economic costs generated during conflict produced a devastating 
effect on the Iranian economy and exacerbated the economic decline that accompanied 
the post-Revolution instability. This combination of instability and war expenditure 
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accounted for a drop in foreign exchange reserves of over $13 billion in the first two 
years of the Islamic Republic.55  Moreover, hydrocarbon revenues, the prime vehicle for 
replenishing foreign reserves, dropped off sharply during this period.56  Despite the 
concerted effort to sustain oil production throughout the war, productivity in the Iranian 
oil sector fell off during the period of 1979–1988, the victim of nationalization and 
subsequent mismanagement as well as the considerable wartime damages to the Iranian 
oil extraction and delivery infrastructure.  As a result, Iranian oil revenues during the 
Iran-Iraq War dropped to an average of 67 percent of pre-war revenues in spite of the rise 
in average oil prices to 138 percent of pre-war prices (1970–1979).57  Additionally, 
defense expenditure ballooned at the expense of government investment in other areas of 
large public sector.  Furthermore, the high casualty rate sustained throughout the war 
combined with the large pockets of refugees displaced by the fighting to create a shortage 
in the accessibility of skilled labor.  The diversion of labor and capital away from more 
productive activity resulted in sustained drops in investment and productivity and an 
overall negative growth output.58  Hence, the portion of the Iranian domestic economy 
not associated with the war effort continued to wither as the war stagnated, further 
reducing the number of available jobs; by 1987 unofficial estimates of Iranian 
unemployment reached nearly one half of the labor force.59 
1. Defense Spending  
As previously mentioned, the Iranian economy experienced strain from the 
exceptionally high rate of defense expenditure maintained throughout the war.  Defense 
expenditure rose to an extraordinary average of 16.9 percent of total government 
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expenditure between 1981 and 1986.60  However, as is shown on the following page in 
Figure 1, this sharp rise in defense expenditure is not mirrored by a similar jump in total 
military imports.  On the contrary, trending in Iranian arms imports diverges radically 
between the 10-year period prior to the Revolution and the three decades of the Islamic 
Republic that followed.  In a single year, arms imports dropped from 3.5 billion USD and 
a positive rate of slightly over 500 million USD per annum to a 600 million USD and a 
negative rate of more than a 13 million USD per annum.   
 
 
Figure 1.   Iranian Arms Imports (1969–2001) 
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Figure 2.   Iranian Defense Expenditure 
It may be reasonably assumed that the Iranian demand for weapons and materiel 
during a period of protracted warfare would not drop considerably from the prewar 
period that preceded it.  While the precise Iranian order of battle is not currently 
available, estimates of equipment and unit end strengths are available through the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies’ annual Military Balance almanacs.  A survey 
of the almanacs covering the Iran-Iraq War period shows that, for the most part, 
domestically produced Iranian military hardware was not fielded during the war.  This is 
not to imply that the initiative to expand Iranian domestic arms production was 
unsuccessful.  In fact, by the late 1980s Iran had eclipsed several venerated arms 
producing nations (Austria, the Scandinavian countries, and Belgium), employing an 
estimated 240 defense-manufacturing sites and approximately 12,000 workshops engaged 
in research and production of military equipment.61  As a result of all this investment, by 
the end of the Iran-Iraq War Iran had developed the capability to domestically produce 
armored vehicles, light and heavy weaponry, advanced missile systems, aircraft parts, 
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artillery systems, and radar and air defense systems.62  This build up in Iran’s defense-
related industrial capacity is important in developing this thesis because by the end of the 
war the Pasdaran had access to the manufacturing and construction infrastructure and 
personnel and this access granted the organization considerable advantage in the coming 
decades.  The following section will argue that the impetus behind this surge in domestic 
defense spending is rooted in U.S. sanctions.  
2. Sanctions and the Embargo  
The opening volley in the lengthy chronicle of sanctions against Iran preceded the 
Iran-Iraq war but would remain in effect long after the last shots were fired.  President 
Carter initiated the first U.S. sanctions against Islamic Republic in response to the 
student-led takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the ensuing hostage crisis.  On 
November 12, 1979, Carter authored Proclamation 4702, invoking the presidential 
powers detailed in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, in order to block the import of 
Iranian crude oil into the United States.  Two days after the release of 4702, Carter issued 
Executive Order 12170, freezing all Iranian government assets subject to U.S. 
jurisdiction.  As the hostage situation stagnated and relations between the United States 
and Iran continued to deteriorate, the Carter administration broadened the reach of 
punitive sanctions.  Carter’s next two executive orders directed at Iran, E.O. 12205 and 
E.O. 12211, both issued in April of 1980, formally ended among other things direct 
access to American-made manufacturing and consumer goods, access to U.S. financial 
markets, and the participation of U.S. companies in the tendering of Iranian industrial 
service contracts.   
A change in the White House following the 1980 presidential elections saw the 
end of the hostage situation in Iran and the lifting of Carter’s embargo.  In accordance 
with U.S. obligations in the Algiers Accords, Iran’s release of the American hostages led  
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to implementation of Executive Orders 12276 through 12284 that removed most of the 
prohibitions enacted under E.O. 12205 and E.O. 12211 and administratively set the stage 
for the return of frozen Iranian assets.   
Although the embargo was officially over, relations between Tehran and 
Washington remained tepid and the new Reagan administration kept intact the policy of 
refusing the direct sale of U.S. arms and equipment to Iran.  As war broke out between 
Iran and neighboring Iraq and Iranian demand for war materiel spiked, this unwillingness 
on the part of the United States to deal with Iran would not prove to be sufficient measure 
to keep U.S. manufactured arms and spare parts out of the hands of the Iranian military.  
This is true because the United States, while largely successful in preventing American 
companies from engaging in direct sales to Iran, was either unable or unwilling to address 
the resale and transshipment of military goods by third parties.  Therefore, at the start of 
the war Iranian access to American military equipment was both constrained and more 
expensive (due to the addition of an intermediary broker) but still available.63   
The bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut on October 1983 brought an 
end to U.S. tolerance of third party weapons channels into Iran.64  Iranian support for 
Islamic Jihad, the group deemed responsible for the Beirut attack, established the theme 
for the next phase of dysfunction between Iran and the United States.  On 19 January 
1984 the U.S. Secretary of State formally determined, under the auspices of the Export 
Administration Act, that Iran had repeatedly “provided support for acts of international 
terrorism” and added Iran to the U.S. list of State Sponsors of Terrorism.  Classification 
as a state sponsor invoked several articles in the Arms Export Control Act and Export 
Administration Act of 1979, which, in turn, established a new formal weapons embargo 
against Iran.  The two Acts worked in concert to automatically block all transfers of 
technology and equipment to Iran that could enhance its military capability or its ability  
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to support terrorism.65  Iran’s designation as a state sponsor also strengthened the hand of 
the U. S. Department of State as it began to apply diplomatic pressure to the home 
countries of Iran’s third party suppliers. 
On 15 December 1983, the State Department implemented a plan to further 
reduce Iranian access to military equipment.  Dubbed Operation Staunch, the effort 
sought to cut the flow of American-made and other foreign military equipment into Iran 
from any country that maintained or desired a strong relationship with the United 
States.66  Michael Armacost, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs during the 
Reagan Administration, described the operation as a series of “vigorous diplomatic 
efforts, through intelligence-sharing and strong demarches, to block or complicate Iranian 
arms resupply efforts on a worldwide basis.”67  Operation Staunch continued for the 
duration of the Iran-Iraq War and is generally regarded as a successful campaign despite 
several conspicuous violations of the effort by the United States, itself. 
3. Rhetoric Versus Reality 
There is a temptation when examining the anti-West vitriol being broadcast out of 
the Islamic Republic during the late 1970s and 1980s to come to the conclusion that the 
dire state of international relations between Iran and the West automatically precluded 
cooperation.  If this were true it would consign the employment of American wartime 
sanctions against Iran to the dustbin of superfluous excess.  Indeed, even a brief survey of 
Iranian propaganda during this period would demonstrate that the two states Khomeini 
publically deems most antithetical to the Revolution are the United States and Israel.  
Israel, the “Little Satan,” receives condemnation as the “origin of anti-Islamic 
propaganda” and a collaborator with Shah for the oppression of Iranian and Palestinian 
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Muslims.68  The United States, the “Great Satan,” receives similar treatment for its 
history of interference in Iranian politics, in particular, for its close sponsorship of the 
Shah and its role in Operation Ajax, the joint CIA-MI6 led coup d'état that reinstalled the 
Pahlavi dynasty to the seat of Iranian power.69  However, as the identity of the 
Revolution solidified, particularly after the 1981 purge of the Communists, the 
isolationist stance of the Islamic Republic began to give way to a more pragmatic 
approach to the outside world.70  As history shows, if loggerheads in the international 
arena been sufficient to block cooperation between Iran and the West, it would have later 
spared Iran, Israel and the United States from some particularly embarrassing revelations.   
In 1981, rumors began to circulate in Tehran alluding to ongoing and highly 
secretive cooperation between Iran and Israel; charges that Ayatollah Khomeini 
vehemently denied.  Despite the Supreme Leader’s claims to the contrary, researchers 
have since uncovered a paper trail that brought to light a history of weapons exchanges 
between Iran and Israel.  The arrangement, dating back from early 1980 and continuing 
through late 1983, involved Israel providing weapons caches to Iran in exchange for 
access to Iranian oil.  Exchanges between the two states resulted in a total of receipts 
topping $500 million.71  Israeli national interests were realized through the 
reestablishment of Iranian oil flow but also, in lending support to a peripheral threat, 
Israel was making progress towards neutralizing the much greater proximate threat 
coming from Iraq.  Israeli involvement in behind-the-scenes deals with Iran was not 
limited to direct deals between the two states, officials from the Jewish state would also 
later play a third party role in the U.S.-Iranian arms debacle.  
November 25, 1986, several years after the implementation of Operation Staunch, 
President Reagan made a nationally televised appearance in an attempt to defuse the 
political firestorm brewing over Washington.  Controversy erupted after the Western 
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media picked up on an article in the Lebanese news magazine Ash Shiraa alleging secret 
arms deals between Iran and the United States.72  As more details of the plot began to 
surface, so too did the evident contradictions in U.S. foreign policy.  The sale of TOW 
and Hawk missile systems to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages being 
held by Iranian-backed Hezbollah represented, at its core, a blatant violation of the U.S.-
led arms embargo.73  A bruised and embarrassed Reagan administration emerged from 
the Iran-Contra Scandal but still made the important decision to bolster rather than 
abandon the U.S. commitment to Operation Staunch and keeping arms out of Iran. 
From the Iranian perspective, the sensitive nature and high potential political costs 
associated with maintaining a hard rhetorical line against the West while simultaneously 
conducting clandestine arms deals with the West leads to an important conclusion.  The 
unofficial arms embargo continued under the Reagan administration and later buttressed 
by the State Department’s Operation Staunch ostensibly stopped the flow of critical 
military equipment into Iran.  Second, despite the large amount of capital provided to the 
DIO for the duration of the war, Iran was unable to meet its own wartime demands for 
manufacturing military equipment.   
4. Passing the Poison 
American sanctions offered another boon to both the military and leadership of 
Iran; sanctions offered a scapegoat.  When Khomeini was finally compelled to drink from 
the poisoned chalice and sue for peace on 20 July 1988, America’s involvement in the 
war (on behalf of Iraq) offered Khomeini an obvious target at that to spit the poison 
back.74  The Iranian government promoted the Iran-Iraq War as an opportunity to reshape 
the regional power structure with Iran in its rightful place as the Middle Eastern hegemon 
and an Islamic crucible where the faith and numbers of the Iranian forces would prevail 
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in the face of the well-equipped, secular Iraqi Army.75  For the duration of the Iran-Iraq 
War, the prominence of the Pasdaran on the battlefield steadily increased at the expense 
of the professional Iranian army.  By the midpoint of the war the Artesh had ceded most 
operational planning and execution to the Pasdaran.76  Given its prominent role in the 
final conduct of the war, the IRGC was in a prime position to inherent the blame for the 
lack of any appreciable Iranian gains at the conclusion of the war.  The United States, by 
withholding military assistance to Iran and actively discouraging assistance from other 
countries, became the target for deflecting criticism away from the government and its 
preferred military force, the Pasdaran.77 
D. CONCLUSION 
During the first nine years of the Islamic Republic, the regime of sanctions 
constructed under the Carter and Reagan Administrations contributed to securing a niche 
for the Pasdaran in the Iranian economy.  This is not meant to imply that sanctions alone 
meet the requirements for necessity or sufficiency as a causal factor in the early stages of 
the empowerment of the IRGC.  As this chapter has endeavored to illustrate, Ayatollah 
Khomeini possessed a vested interest in promoting the Pasdaran as it served the function 
of security apparatus for his particular element of the 1979 Revolution.  However, as this 
section argues, the effects of these sanctions manifested in ways that contributed to the 
eventual success of the Pasdaran.   
Recalling the first hypothesis introduced in Chapter I, Sanctions created a 
military-industrial gap in Iran on which the IRGC could capitalize, an examination of the 
Revolutionary and Iran-Iraq War periods shows that the abrupt withdrawal of U.S. 
defense manufacturers from the Iranian defense industry created a large gap in Iran’s 
capacity to produce defense materiel.  This productivity gap proved particularly 
significant to Iranian security during the 1980s as the state embarked on its costly eight 
year war with Iraq.  The Carter administration stopped direct sales of U.S. manufactured 
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arms and materiel to Iran through an executive order based embargo.  The Reagan 
administration continued the weapons embargo, initially, through an informal policy of 
prohibiting arms sales to Iran.  Iranian designation as a State Sponsor of Terror in 1983 
triggered articles in the Arms Export Control Act and Export Administration Act of 1979 
and formalized the prohibition on weapons sales to Iran.  The following year the U.S. 
State Department exacerbated the Iranian defense gap with the implementation of 
Operation Staunch.  By targeting the third party suppliers acting as clearing houses for 
weapons shipments, Operation Staunch attempted to sever the back channel flow of U.S. 
weapons into Iran.   
The Islamic Republic endeavored to alleviate the gap in foreign-sourced combat 
equipment with massive investment in domestic defense production and the adoption of 
human wave tactics.  As the Iran-Iraq War drudged on, Iranian defense expenditure 
ballooned, averaging nearly 17 percent of GDP.  The Pasdaran, due to their position at 
the helm of the Iranian defense manufacturing conglomerate, Defense Industries 
Organization, were uniquely situated to capture this windfall defense spending.  By the 
mid-1980s Iran is estimated to have been operating 240 defense-manufacturing sites and 
12,000 workshops.  Hence, as the dust settled and the Iranian government took stock of 
the damage to the country’s infrastructure and the economy in general, the Guards, with 
their surplus of personnel and manufacturing and construction equipment, were ideally 
positioned to carve out a large slice of the Iranian economy for themselves in the coming 
decade. 
Again, it is important to recognize that the Pasdaran functions as the security 
apparatus for the theocratic government, and, in all likelihood, Ayatollah Khomeini 
entrusted the DIO to the IRGC as another mechanism to strengthen IRGC position 
relative to the regular armed forces.  However, it is unlikely that Khomeini and the 
Islamic Republic would have directed such a large portion of Iranian resources toward 
the development of Iranian defense manufacturing if sanctions limiting access to ready-
made and superior American-made equipment were not firmly in place.  The “imposed 
war” with Iraq represented one of the ideological crown jewels for the Iranian 
revolutionary experiment and Khomeini and his supporters undertook great sacrifices to 
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achieve victory.  This idea is supported by the fact that over the course of the war Iran 
engaged in multiple arms deals with the two countries to which it was most ideologically 
opposed, Israel and the United States.   
Sanctions during this period of time would also prove beneficial to the Pasdaran 
with respect to the second hypothesis, Sanctions allow IRGC to capitalize on identity as 
guardians of Islamic Revolution.  The conduct of the Iran-Iraq War, in particular the 
employment of a war of attrition strategy and human wave tactics, engendered the Basij 
and the Pasdaran with bona fides in terms of dedication to the state and its Islamic 
government.  However, as the war progressed and the IRGC assumed a greater leadership 
role in combat operations the fate of the Pasdaran became increasingly tied to the 
outcome of the conflict.  At the conclusion of the war, having failed to produce any 
returns for Iran, the regime and its security apparatus used the United States as a means to 
deflect criticism from the regime.  Khomeini specifically points towards the U.S. 
embargo and its role in keeping all arms and equipment out of Iran as one of the 
fundamental causes for the lackluster performance of the Iranian security forces.    
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III. BUILDING UP THROUGH RECONSTRUCTION (1989–2004) 
This [IRGC involvement in the Iranian economy] all started with 
Rafsanjani saying: go and make money, and they went and did this and 
thought, this is easy.  
Ali Ansari78 
A. POST-WAR CHANGES 
The period following the Iran-Iraq War is one marked by change on both sides of 
the Iranian-American dialectic.  In Tehran, the death of the Revolution’s charismatic 
leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, combined with a lingering sense of public 
dissatisfaction with the outcome of the war to substantively change the character and base 
of the theocracy.  In Washington D.C., the startling discovery of an advanced Iraqi 
unconventional weapons program generated new concerns in the United States with 
respect to the possibility of similar programs or ambitions coming out of other regional 
actors.  Iran was prime candidate for focusing these new concerns due to its previous 
attempt at constructing a nuclear program under Shah Pahlavi, possession of vast natural 
resource wealth and established track record for supporting terrorist organizations. 
1. Moderation in the Elected Officials 
Backlash from the Iran-Iraq War damped the popular revolutionary fire in the 
Islamic Republic.  A tattered economy, damaged and aging public infrastructure and 
ailing Khomeini led to a popular reshaping of the elected government into an organ more 
focused on domestic concerns than exporting revolution to the oppressed.  Presidents 
Rafsanjani (1989–1997) and Khatami (1997–2005) brought into office a new paradigm of 
economic liberalization and pragmatism.  In practice, though, this new paradigm would 
still be tempered by a smaller, though indefatigably influential, conservative cleric base.  
Economic agendas under the liberalizers included building free markets, encouraging 
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foreign investment in Iran, and privatizing the bonyads (large para-statal foundations that 
dominate the Iranian economy).  The Rafsanjani government also tested improving 
relations with the United States, awarding a one billion dollar oilfield development 
contract to the U.S. oil company Conoco.79  However, this is not to imply anything more 
than a signal for cautious rapprochement from the Iranian presidency as diplomatic 
overtures from both the Rafsanjani and Khatami governments fell short of requests for 
direct talks with their respective U.S. administrations.80 
Popular reformist sentiment was only partially mirrored in the highest echelon of 
Iranian government.  Shortly before his death, Khomeini replaced his longtime heir-
apparent to Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Hussein Montazeri, with President Ali Khamenei.  
This last minute reshuffling of the line of succession occurred as a result of Montazeri 
breaking ranks with the conservative ulama (religious leadership) party line. Ayatollah 
Montazeri became a liability to conservatives when his letters to the Supreme Leader, 
articles in the Kayhan daily paper, and nationally broadcast speeches began to criticize 
the brutish tactics employed by the regime to consolidate power and silence dissent.81   
The popularity of Montazeri insulated him against direct attack from the conservative 
element his rhetoric was alienating. Khamenei, on the other hand, did not enjoy the same 
level of popular support as Montazeri and, therefore, would not command the same 
degree of latitude and independence from the conservative clerical base.  By replacing 
Montazeri with Khamenei the conservative element of Iranian politics believed they 
could establish a dependency in the Supreme Leader and maintain a core of power for the 
benefit of conservative members of the ulama.82  However, in practice the ongoing rule 
of Ayatollah Khamenei does not exhibit such an unrepentantly conservative stripe.  
Instead, the pragmatic Khamenei has utilized temporary alignments with virtually all of 
Iranian powerbrokers in an effort to remain atop of the factious theocracy.  Conservative  
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clerics, however, were not the only bulwark against Iranian transformation.  Events and 
perceptions outside of Iran would act to similarly constrain changes, particularly in terms 
of Iranian relations with the United States and the West. 
2. Containment and Concern 
Two years after the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam Hussein gathered 
the sizable modern army he had assembled during the 1980s, marshalling them towards 
the southern Iraqi border and the rich oilfields of Kuwait.  In response, the United States 
gathered a coalition of 32 states, eight of which were regional states, against its former 
ally Iraq.  In Tehran, Khamenei and Rafsanjani adopted an “active neutrality policy” for 
Iran that kept the republic on the sidelines for the duration of the war.83  However, Iran’s 
abstention from the war would not lead to any appreciable rapprochement with the 
United States.84  On the contrary, as the war unfolded, the U.S. perspective of the entire 
Middle East became colored by the discovery of a surprisingly advanced Iraqi nuclear 
program.  The secret Iraqi program prompted a renewed American suspicion of other 
regional actors and resulted in a strengthening of U.S. efforts to keep weapons of mass 
destruction and missile technology out of the Middle East.  George H.W. Bush’s Middle 
East Arms Control Initiative is one of the first of these efforts that would ultimately 
elevate the issue of nuclear arms (and the broader category of weapons of mass 
destruction) to the status of cause celeb; a status it would enjoy for at least the next two 
decades of U.S.-Middle Eastern politics.   
The question naturally arises as to why the Middle East is deserving of such 
singular attention with respect to the nuclear issue.  Beyond the inherent risks associated 
with the addition of any nuclear-armed state to the international community, the Bush 
White House suggested that the Middle East of the 1990s exhibited several factors that 
compounded the potential threat of a new nuclear state.  First, both sides of the Iran-Iraq 
War employed chemical warfare along the front lines and, in so doing, established a 
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precedent within the region for the utilization of unconventional weapons.85  Second, 
Saddam Hussein’s attempts to obfuscate his nuclear program and obstruct IAEA 
inspections after the war demonstrated a strong desire to maintain its clandestine nuclear 
weapons program in spite of its discovery and subsequent international condemnation.86  
Third, the vast hydrocarbon wealth within the region generates revenue streams for the 
governments of resource-endowed states that require little oversight or transparency.  
Hence, a decade before the threat of WMDs became the oft-touted casus belli of the 
second U.S.-led war in Iraq, it had already established a pattern of shaping U.S. regional 
policy.  Among the various policy manifestations of the Middle Eastern nuclear concern 
was a sizable augmentation of the sanctions program against Iran. 
B. CLINTONIAN EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTS 
In addition to Iran’s status as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (Hezbollah, Hamas, 
and Palestine Islamic Jihad), the nuclear threat generated the requisite political will in the 
executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government to coerce change in Iran 
through political and economic isolation.  The 1990s saw actions from both the White 
House and Congress in an effort to contain Iran through a series of legislative acts and 
executive orders. 
The Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, P.L. 102-484 brought Iran 
under the umbrella of several sections of the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990, P.L. 101-513.  
This new law echoed the sentiment of the White House’s Middle East Arms Control 
Initiative in its focus on preventing the transfer to Iraq or Iran of “any goods or 
technology, including dual-use goods or technology, wherever that transfer could 
materially contribute to either country's acquiring chemical, biological, nuclear, or 
destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons.”87  The Iran-Iraq 
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Arms Non-Proliferation Act has successfully triggered sanctions against twelve entities 
since its inception.88  Executive Order 12938, issued by the Clinton administration on 
November 14, 1994, was not aimed specifically at Iran but affected the state tangentially 
with its treatment of the proliferation of WMD technology.  Under E.O. 12938, states 
accused of proliferating WMD technology faced the loss of U.S. foreign assistance, 
access to credit and Multilateral Development Bank assistance, access to U.S. arms and 
national security-sensitive goods and technology, and additional imports and exports 
restrictions.89  The Order did not find much traction prior to its inclusion in the Iran 
Nonproliferation Act of 2000 and Executive Order 13382; which will be discussed in 
Chapter IV.  However, sanctions issued under the auspices of preventing Iran from 
obtaining weapons of mass destruction, as later Clintonian executive orders and the Iran 
and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 would demonstrate, were not going to be strictly 
confined to actual transfers in weapons or weapon technology. 
1. Iranian Vulnerability 
The aging and underdeveloped Iranian energy sector became the target of 
opportunity for sanction efforts throughout the middle to late 1990s.  Hydrocarbon 
production, a historically important source of revenue for the Islamic Republic, has 
accounted for a figure between 20 and 30 percent of Iranian gross domestic product over 
the lifetime of the theocracy and over 60 percent of the revenue of the state.90  Iran ranks 
in the top three countries in the world in terms of proven reserves of oil (ranking third) 
and natural gas (ranking second).91  However, before Iran could capitalize on its natural 
resource potential, the state would require modernization of its entire oil infrastructure in 
conjunction with the development of a liquefied natural gas infrastructure sufficient to tap 
the vast Iranian natural gas deposits.  Iranian policy makers, in an acknowledgement of 
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the disrepair of their energy sector, partially abrogated from the revolutionary mandate 
prohibiting foreign firms from participating in domestic natural resource production.  The 
government introduced a system of buyback contracts that allowed foreign firms to 
develop Iranian oilfields in exchange for a share of state production from the National 
Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).  Under the terms of the buyback contracts, foreign firms 
were responsible for the construction and initial operation of oilfield infrastructure but 
would gradually cede control of day-to-day operations to NIOC until the state had gained 
complete control over the production facilities at the end of the contract.   
This requirement for foreign sources of capital and technical expertise to develop 
the Iranian energy sector allowed U.S. policy makers to target the flow of oil by 
discouraging American and foreign investment.  First, the theory followed that stunted 
growth in the energy sector would then deprive Iran of the requisite resources to continue 
the development of its nuclear program or continue its funding of terrorist activities 
abroad.92  Second, oil revenues are a sensitive domestic political issue in that they fuel 
Iran’s vast subsidy program.  These subsidies represent an increasingly costly endeavor 
but have become enmeshed in the practice of Islamic egalitarianism and, thus, in the 
social contract with the state.  During the buildup to the Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini 
promised that the new regime would, “build real estate, make water and power free, and 
make buses free,” and such promises are not easily cast aside.93  The disruptive potential 
of limiting or eliminating subsidies was revealed in 2007 after government attempts to 
ration fuel led to rioting and demonstrations in Tehran and several other major cities.94 
Energy subsidies, specifically subsidies on gasoline, are particularly vexing to the 
economy as demand for subsidized gasoline in Iran has increased on the order of 11–12 
percent per annum for the previous two decades.95  The International Monetary Fund 
calculated energy subsidies at approximately 17.5 percent of Iranian GDP (2006) and 
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rising.96  Thus, hampering the development of the Iranian energy sector offered the direct 
benefit of decreasing the amount of revenue available to the government and the indirect 
benefit of placing pressure on the regime by threatening the state subsidy program.  With 
this desired end state clearly in focus, the White House and Congress enacted a series of 
measures to ramp up the economic pressure on Iran. 
On March 15, 1995, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12957 prohibiting 
American investment in the Iranian energy sector.  E.O. 12957 came just ten days after 
Rafsanjani’s alleged appeal for more open economic relations between Iran and the 
United States, the one billion dollar contract to U.S. oil company Conoco to develop the 
Sirra A and E oil fields.97  Within two months the Clinton White House extended the 
reach of U.S. sanctions, issuing Executive Order 12959 (May 6, 1995) that banned all 
U.S. trade with Iran as well as eliminating Iranian access to American finance and 
investment organs.  Executive Order 13059, issued August 19, 1997, consolidated and 
clarified E.O. 12957 and E.O. 12959, reiterating the U.S. position that virtually all trade 
and investment activity in Iran was prohibited.  The centerpiece for countering Iranian 
nuclear ambitions, however, originated not in the White House, but the U.S. Capital 
Building.   
2. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 
The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA), P.L. 104–172, and its 
subsequent forms, represented the most comprehensive unilateral sanctioning to date 
targeting development in the Iranian energy sector.  What set ILSA apart from previous 
sanctions rounds was that ILSA sought to make the threat of sanctions more universal; 
thus, making the sanction affects more comprehensive and preventing U.S. companies 
from being singularly disadvantaged to global competitors that were not similarly 
constrained from participating in the development of the Iranian energy sector.  In order 
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to accomplish these ends, ILSA created a menu of six secondary sanctions and a 
combination of two of these six sanctions were to be applied to any company investing 
more than 20 million dollars in Iran.  The secondary sanctions aspect of ILSA generated 
considerable acrimony from the European Union and prompted the EU to lodge a formal 
complaint against United States with the World Trade Organization.98  The Clinton 
White House, not wishing to bring about unnecessary estrangement from its European 
allies, gradually backed away from enforcing ILSA.  Hence, the actual effectiveness of 
ILSA in deterring foreign investment in Iran remains a matter of some debate.  
 
Figure 3.   Net FDI Flow in the Islamic Republic of Iran (1979–2004) 
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Figure 4.   Imports of Goods & Services as Percent GDP (1979–2004) 
A 2006 Congressional Research Service report shows that although ILSA may 
have initially acted as a strong deterrent to investment in Iranian oil and gas production, 
after the Clinton Administration issued the first ILSA waiver in 1998 investment in Iran -
reached a total $11.5 billion over the course of next five years (1999–2004).99  This trend 
agrees with values expressed in Figures 3 and 4, which show relatively flat values 
throughout the mid to late 1990s followed by a large uptick in both net foreign direct 
investment and value of imports coming into Iran after 2001. However, while this 
investment is not to be discounted, energy market analysts generally agree that the level 
of investment is still far below the amount required to completely modernize the energy 
sector.100  The Iranian refining infrastructure remains hopelessly outdated, with the 
average gasoline production per barrel of oil trailing that of modern refineries by roughly 
                                                 
99 Katzman, The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, 3–4. 
100 Stern, “The Iranian Petroleum Crisis and United States National Security,” 378–9. 
 40
50 percent.101  Furthermore, the list of energy-related companies capable of bridging this 
gap and willing to conduct business with Iran is short and shrinking.102   
C. THERMIDOR AND REFORM 
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, post-war elected officials in the 
Iranian government began to reflect less revolutionary zeal in favor of a more 
domestically focused approach to the day-to-day ministering of the theocracy.  The 
passing of Ayatollah Khomeini and his subsequent replacement with then-President Ali 
Khamenei shifted much of the informal political power away from the position of 
Supreme Leader.103  Consequently, in executing the duties of his office, Khamenei 
became more reliant on co-opting parallel sources of power than his predecessor.  Iran’s 
new President, Ali Hashemi Rafsanjani, represented a natural ally for Khamenei.  Prior to 
assuming office, Rafsanjani had worked hand in hand with Khamenei as part of the 
Assembly for Reconsideration of the Constitution.  The primary task of the Assembly 
was to recast the presidency through a series of constitutional reforms, transforming the 
office from its previous primarily ceremonial function of state figurehead into a position 
with some real political power.  These measures centralized power and instilled the 
presidency with greater executive authority by removing the post of Prime Minister and 
transferring those powers to the president, creating the presidentially-appointed office of 
a Vice President, and allowing the president to select and dismiss ministers (pending 
Majlis approval).104   
As Rafsanjani assumed the new duties of his office, he formed a liberalizing 
duumvirate with the Supreme Leader.  Together, Khamenei and Rafsanjani set about on a 
series of structural reforms ending the practice of rationing, easing price controls, 
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attempting to balance the national budget, cutting defense expenditure to less than two 
percent of the budget, and launching a very effective campaign to control Iran’s birth 
rate.105  For the purposes of this thesis the efforts of Khamenei and Rafsanjani toward 
balancing the budget and cutting defense spending are particularly salient issues.  Some 
of the policies crafted to achieve these fiscally responsible ends effectively unleashed the 
IRGC into the entire Iranian economy.   
In order to bring the national budget into balance the post-war Iranian government 
began to focus more of its attention on efforts to control public spending.  The defense 
budget, already receding from its wartime high water mark, offered one potential area for 
deeper cuts.  Culling defense spending from the national budget, however, presented 
some considerable potential drawbacks for Iran.  First, Iraq, the source of the recent 
“imposed” war, remained a serious threat and regional rival.  The Iraqi military benefitted 
significantly from connections with the world’s major arms suppliers during the war.  
Iraqi military power increased not only through the growing sophistication of its 
equipment but through a tremendous expansion in size; having grown from a quarter of a 
million people in 1980 to one million in 1990.106  While a substantial portion of the Iraqi 
war machine was destroyed during the First Gulf War, the elite Iraqi Republican Guard 
forces were left largely untouched by the fighting and continued to represent a 
considerable threat to neighboring Iran.  Second, as mentioned in the previous chapter, 
the Iranian economy at the end of the war was in the midst of record unemployment and 
therefore not in a position to absorb a large influx of military veterans into the labor 
market.  Given this situation, Rafsanjani confronted strong economic reasons to decrease 
the size of the military as well as strong economic and security reasons to maintain its 
strength.  In response, the government adopted a policy that would spur Iranian 
reconstruction, cut defense costs, and largely retain the force structure of the Pasdaran: 
the solution was to essentially privatize the Guards’ marketable services.  
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D. GHORB & ECONOMIC EMPIRE BUILDING 
The underlying legal justification for the Pasdaran’s current ubiquitous presence 
in the Iranian economy can be traced back to Article 147 of the Iranian constitution. 
Article 147: In time of peace, the government must utilize the personnel 
and technical equipment of the Army in relief operations, and for 
educational and productive ends, and the Construction Jihad, while fully 
observing the criteria of Islamic justice and ensuring that such utilization 
does not harm the combat-readiness of the Army.107 
In order to generate revenue, the IRGC leveraged the engineering capacity 
developed during the Iran-Iraq War and through the conglomeration of businesses within 
its associated bonyads to found Gharargah Sazandegi Khatam al-Anbia, more commonly 
known by its abbreviation Ghorb.  The engineering firm has since grown to monolithic 
proportions employing an estimated 25,000 engineers and staff personnel.108  Hefty 
resourcing does not necessarily correlate with effective business practices.  As a Tehran-
based private contractor would later complain:  
They [Ghorb] have more equipment and finance than any other contractor 
in the country.  But they aren't professional, they aren't a normal company 
and they don't play by the same rules. There's nothing you can do, nobody 
you can complain to.109   
Ghorb executives are quick to point out that Ghorb activity outside the military 
realm represents a modest portion of its total operations, comprising only 30 percent.  
However, independent verification of this claim or others regarding Ghorb’s activity is 
difficult to accomplish as the conglomerate has not been forthcoming in providing the 
details of its many alleged contracts (both completed and ongoing) to the Iranian press.110  
The nature of Ghorb becomes even more opaque when it comes to the matter of where 
and how the profits from its entrepreneurial activities are spent.   
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1. Ghorb and the Oil Industry  
Iranian Oil Minister Kazem Vaziri-Hameneh’s statement during the recent 
signing of a gas pipeline contract that, "the Oil Ministry has started a new move, aimed at 
taking advantage of all existing potentials in the country" is indicative of the new major 
economic inroad for the Guards.111  The steep run-up of oil prices during between 2000 
and 2007 should have bolstered Iran’s Foreign Exchange Reserve and fueled a healthy 
Oil Stability Fund.  Instead, Iranian oil revenues began to fall under the weight of sagging 
production and spiraling domestic consumption.  The paradox of rising oil prices and 
shrinking oil revenues led the Oil Ministry to sound the alarm in September of 2006, 
claiming that Iranian oil revenues could continue to slide at an annual rate of 13 percent 
without the addition of significant investment to the energy sector.112   
The under-developed Iranian energy sector, favored target of Clinton era 
sanctions, has provided fertile ground for Ghorb’s economic ambition.  Since 2006, 
Ghorb has won multiple lucrative contracts to develop the energy sector including a $2 
billion contract for the second phase of the developing the South Pars gas field and a $1.3 
billion contract for a gas pipeline extending to the border with Pakistan.113  In February 
of this year, the Treasury Department raised pressure on development firms operating in 
Iran.  This increased pressure led to Shell, Total, Respol, and a consortium of several 
Turkish developers disabusing themselves of Iranian tenders.114  As the European firms 
were withdrawing from Iran, President Ahmadinejad began telling Ghorb executives to 
prepare to “enter high-end oil and gas activities in order to satisfy the domestic needs of 
the country.”115  This phenomenon is consistent with previous instances in the Islamic 
Republic when foreign competition contracted, the domestic activity expanded.  
However, the growing political presence of the Guards (post-2003) and the codependency 
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between the Guards and the executive means that domestic economic opportunity in the 
new millennium is becoming the exclusive domain of the Guards and their coterie.  
2. Sanctions in the Dialogue Between the People and the State 
Sanctions have found a place in the dialogue between the people and the state as a 
way to justify internalization.  From the pulpit of the Tehran Friday morning prayer 
service Mohammad Emami Kashani recently included the message that, “in light of 
recent sanctions, economic cohesion should be placed higher on the agenda,” advocating 
for listeners to withdraw foreign held capital and consume domestically produced 
goods.116  President Ahmadinejad has also been quick to characterize sanctions as 
an, “opportunity to develop our own products and globalize Iranian products.”117  
Considering the large IRGC presence in the economy, the Guards have interests in 
sectors as diverse as automobile manufacture, tourist resorts, life insurance, and 
laser eye surgery, the organization stands to benefit greatly through increased 
internalization of demand.118  The IRGC’s media outlets and educational material also 
rationalize the Pasdaran presence in Iranian culture and societal affairs through the lens 
of sanctions, claiming that such a presence is needed to counter the “U.S. assault” and 
that intervention in the economy is necessary to protect Iran from sanctions regimes.119  
Hence, as sanctions assist the ongoing militarization of Iran, they also provide a 
convenient tool for rationalizing the takeover.   
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E. SMUGGLING NETWORKS 
Sanctions are shifting the flow of goods into Iran underground and into the 
smuggling networks.  The Clintonian Executive Orders placed obvious restrictions on the 
export and re-export/transshipment of American-made with E.O. 12959 and 13059, but 
one Order, E.O. 12938, placed restrictions on the supply of many foreign produced goods 
as well.  Under E.O. 12938, the United States threatened to impose sanctions against 
states it deemed to be involved in proliferating WMD technology; inherent in the 
definition of proliferation is the transfer of anything from the large basket of goods and 
technologies that meet IAEA criteria for dual-use.  These goods do not lose their appeal 
or utility for Iranian consumers simply because they appear on a sanctions list.  
Furthermore, the blanket of “dual-use” is fairly general and covers many items have 
common commercial and industrial applications.120  Hence, as demand within Iran for 
sanctioned goods persists, sufficient demand will eventually draw a supply; a supply 
facilitated, in this case, through smuggling.  It then follows that the broader the swath of 
sanctions in place the more goods will be diverted into transnational smuggling networks.  
As it so happens, smuggling networks have grown over the last two decades and become 
a considerable economic opportunity for the IRGC; the Pasdaran charge of guarding the 
Revolution has translated into an informal role as the head of Iranian black market. 
1. By Sea 
The nexus for much of the smuggling activity into Iran is the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE).  According to a 2010 Government Accounting Office report on sanction 
effectiveness, the UAE has functioned as the source for more than half of the U.S. Justice 
Department cases against intermediaries.121  Dubai, second largest of the seven Emirates 
that comprise the UAE, is known colloquially as the “best city in Iran,” and is home to 
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over nine thousand Iranian businesses and more than 400,000 Iranian nationals.122  Dubai 
is characterized as an “absolute sieve” and that at any given time along the docks of 
Dubai Creek, dhows are being outfitted with goods destined for Iran.123  As Babak 
Dehghanpisheh illustrates in his article, Smugglers for the State, that the strengthening of 
the Iranian sanctions regime has produced a significant change in the character of 
Dubai’s seagoing traffic; wherein container ships are being replaced by a steadily 
growing fleet of smugglers.124  The smuggling fleet out of the UAE accounts for over 50 
percent of the total traffic, intermingling with ships from Malaysia and Singapore, that 
account for an additional 20 percent, as well as ships from Australia, Canada, and the 
European countries Austria, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom.125  This shift in the flow of trade from legitimate channels into 
smuggling has proven to be a very beneficial arrangement for the IRGC.  In following 
this illicit flow of goods across the Persian Gulf into Iran there is a very good chance of 
encountering the Pasdaran at some stage in the process. 
On the receiving end, Mehdi Karrubi, Speaker of the Majlis and outspoken critic 
against conservative elements of the government, made waves in Tehran by becoming the 
first politician to disclose the existence of over 60 illegal docks operating under the 
jurisdiction of the IRGC.126  These docks exist to circumvent both Iranian and 
international oversight and service the fleet of smugglers moving goods into Iran.  Ali 
Qanbari, member of the Majlis, claims that over one-third of the nation’s imports are  
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sourced through the underground economy and these unauthorized docks.127  However, 
the IRGC smuggling network, while based primarily along the jetties of southern Iran, is 
not restricted to the Persian Gulf coastline.    
2. By Air 
The Pasdaran are also believed to maintain a network of import/export sites at 
over 20 major airports throughout Iran.128  In this case, IRGC presence entails anything 
from exclusive control over a portion of the airport’s customs receiving area to providing 
security for the entire airport.  The most dramatic display of IRGC control over the 
airports occurred on May 8, 2004 when the Guards garnered international attention with 
their opening day takeover of the Imam Khomeini Airport.  In order to make their 
intentions unmistakable, the IRGC positioned tanks to block the airport runways, 
preventing outbound flights and forcing the diversion of all inbound to adjacent airports.  
Analysts speculate that the IRGC takeover was motivated partially in retaliation against 
the Iranian government for passing over the IRGC contract bid in favor of management 
by the Turkish-Austrian consortium Tepe-Akfen-Vie and partially to ensure that 
Pasdaran could maintain control over Iran’s newest and largest international airport.129  
Even without considering the underlying motivations, the Imam Khomeini Airport 
takeover is telling in that it illustrates the growing independence of the Pasdaran from 
the government.   
3. IRGC Incentives 
Control over the estimated $12 billion Iranian smuggling network benefits the 
IRGC and its nebulous web of front companies and affiliates at several different 
levels.130  First, the IRGC derives revenue directly from smugglers.  According to 
sources within smuggling network, the Pasdaran charge a fee when intercepting 
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smugglers at sea, though rarely confiscate illicit cargo, and a fee to use the 
aforementioned network of illegal docks.131  These fees could be absorbed by the 
smuggler but are more likely transferred through intermediaries to the consumer in the 
form of a larger premium on smuggled goods.  Second, by establishing their 
organization’s own free trade ports affiliate companies and patrons of the IRGC benefit 
from not having to pay the IRGC imposed smuggling fees or the average 26 percent 
tariffs (2008) applied to imports by the Iranian government.132  Finally, while revenues 
garnered from smuggling activity benefit local Pasdaran commanders they also find their 
way into the Guards’ central financial network.  The IRGC Cooperative Foundation, the 
Mehr Finance & Credit Institution, the Ansar Financial and Credit Institute, and a host of 
smaller financial institutions consolidate the Guards’ economic gains.133  This resource 
pool offers the IRGC the requisite liquidity to be a major player in the Tehran Stock 
Exchange and Iranian privatization efforts, a topic that will be explored in greater detail 
in Chapter IV.  
F. CONCLUSION 
The post-war period of IRGC activity in the Islamic Republic largely falls within 
the third hypothesis: Sanction effects on private enterprise are greater than sanction 
effects on IRGC.  The death of the Ayatollah Khomeini effectively brought an end to the 
era of populist rule over the Islamic Republic. Khamenei, successor to Khomeini, was 
selected by ulama sponsors in an effort to prevent the marginalization of conservative 
element, but has since proven to be a more moderate pragmatist and cautious supporter of 
governmental reform.  In concert with Khamenei, the Rafsanjani and Khatami 
presidencies introduced modest political, economic, and social reforms.  Included in these 
reforms was a new policy that encouraged the IRGC to participate in the private economy 
as well as a renewed effort to lure foreign investment into Iran.  However, as Iran 
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endeavored to open its economy the U.S. Congress and the Clinton White House 
endeavored to keep Iran isolated.  To these ends, the aging Iranian hydrocarbon 
infrastructure was of particular interest to the United States for deterring Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions.  The IRGC benefitted from the sanctions-based prohibition of American 
competition and from U.S. efforts to pressure other foreign firms from participating in 
Iranian development and reconstruction.   
The sanctions regime of the 1990s and early 2000s managed to have some success 
in constraining the legitimate flow of goods into Iran.  Unfortunately, Iranian domestic 
demand for dual-use and American-made goods did not fall in concert with the legitimate 
supply and, thus, squeezed the supply of these goods into the transnational smuggling 
networks.  The IRGC dominates Iranian smuggling through an informal network of 
jetties and presence in key airports.  The Pasdaran benefits directly from smuggling 
activity from the fees it imposes on goods smuggled into Iran.  Pasdaran affiliated 
companies are exempted from having to pay this IRGC premium (as well as import duties 
imposed by the state) and gives them a considerable cost-savings over less well 
connected private competitors. 
This chapter also explored the continuing role of the second hypothesis, sanctions 
allow IRGC to capitalize on identity as guardians of Islamic Revolution, in shaping the 
internal dialogue within Iran.  In addressing public concern over the growing influence of 
the IRGC, both the state and the Pasdaran attempt to paint the IRGC’s political, social, 
and economic presence as an effort to shield the Iranian people against their enemies 
abroad.  In this way, the Guardians of the Revolution protect Iranian society from the 
corruption and cultural erosion associated with Western influence while the Guard’s 
expanding economic role mitigates the potential damage that sanctions could cause to the 
Iranian economy. 
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IV. PRESIDENCY AND PRIVATIZATION (2005-2010) 
The IRGC is so deeply entrenched in Iran's economy and commercial 
enterprises, it is increasingly likely that, if you are doing business with 
Iran, you are doing business with the IRGC.  
U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson134 
A. THE PERSISTENCE OF THE NUCLEAR ISSUE  
The nuclear issue remains the predominant issue standing between Iran and the 
United States.  While this chapter primarily concerns events from 2005 onward, the Iran 
Nonproliferation Act of 2000, P.L. 106-178 and its expansion via the Iran 
Nonproliferation Amendments Act of 2005, are worthy of mention here.  The Iran 
Nonproliferation Act is significant for the realm of international business in that the Act, 
like ILSA before it, applies secondary sanctions against foreign firms providing 
assistance to Iran.135  Under P.L. 106–178, foreign firms are once again subject to 
penalties for noncompliance; adding the penalties of Executive Order 12938 to those of 
the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act.  Unlike ILSA, however, 
the Iran Nonproliferation Act has been invoked to apply extraterritorial sanctions to 
foreign firms over 80 times since being signed into law and has, therefore, set a much 
more threatening precedent of U.S. action against foreign firms operating in Iran.136   
In the early and middle part of the first decade of 2000, much of the previous 
attention paid to the Iranian nuclear threat was directed elsewhere.  In the wake of the 
9/11 terrorist attacks, the focus of the United States was fixed on the two new U.S. 
military theaters in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom) and Iraq (Operation Iraqi 
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Freedom).  This lapse in attention proved to be only temporary as several recent events 
brought the Iranian nuclear issue back into focus for U.S. policy makers and popular 
media.  In September of 2009, Iran divulged the existence of a secret uranium enrichment 
facility outside of the sacred city of Qom, a site known to Western intelligence circles 
since 2007.137  Furthermore, in the five months following its acknowledgement of the 
facility at Qom, Tehran disclosed plans to construct an additional 10 enrichment facilities 
to the International Atomic Energy Agency and touted its achievement of the 20 percent 
uranium enrichment benchmark.138    
In response to the Iranian nuclear threat, on 1 July 2010, President Obama signed 
the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 
(CISAD), H.R. 2194, into law.  The specifics of CISAD are discussed in detail at a later 
point in this chapter, however, the Act warrants mention here as it depicts the strong 
resurgence concern within the United States with regard to Iranian nuclear ambitions.  As 
evidence, while the sunset provision of H.R. 2194 requires that Iran to cease, “providing 
support for acts of international terrorism,” in addition to ending its, “pursuit, acquisition, 
and development of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles and 
ballistic missile launch technology,” the justifying sections are heavily slanted towards 
the nuclear issue.  Nine items out of ten in the Section 2, Findings, and six items out of 
eight in Section 3, Sense of Congress, directly relate to the Iranian nuclear program.139 
B. CHANGING OF THE GUARDS: POLITICIZATION 
Ayatollah Khomeini cautioned against the mixing of the military and politics in 
his last will and testament, writing: 
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My emphatic counsel to the armed forces is to observe abide by the 
military rule of non-involvement in politics. Do not join any political 
party, group or faction. No military man, security policeman, no 
Revolutionary Guard or Basij may enter into politics.140 
In spite of the clarity of this admonition and the historic alignment between the 
Pasdaran and the revolutionary founder, the last several years have proven to be a very 
successful period for a cadre of politically savvy Guardsmen.  During the Majlis elections 
in February 2004, almost 60 percent of the elected officials (91 of the 152) could claim a 
background in the IRGC.141  Presidential elections the following year included three 
candidates, in addition to Ahmadinejad, with an association to the IRGC.  By late 2009, 
34 former IRGC officers were filling senior-level posts in the government including over 
half of the Ahmadinejad presidential cabinet.142  
The growing the political presence of the IRGC is consistent with the expansionist 
interpretation of Article 150 adopted by many of the Pasdaran and their supporters.  
Article 150 states that the IRGC will maintain, “Its role of guarding the Revolution and 
its achievements.”143  Under this broad context, senior leadership in the IRGC has 
proselytized and mobilized against various “counter-revolutionary” factions, the list of 
that includes some of the highest members of the Iranian government.  During the 
Rafsanjani era, the public schism between the president and senior IRGC leaders, 
particularly IRGC chief Major General Mohsen Rezai, played out in the headlines of 
Iranian newspapers and erupted in violent clashes between security forces and liberal 
activists at Iranian universities and cinemas.144  One month after the surprising results of 
the 1997 presidential election, which resulted in political outsider Mohammad Khatami 
receiving almost 70 percent of the votes, Supreme Leader Khamenei removed General 
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Rezai from his post.145 Rezai’s replacement, Major General Yahya Safavi, upheld the 
tradition of directing criticism towards the presidency; taking issue with President 
Khatami’s efforts to implement gradual liberal reform within the government.146  The 
latitude of the IRGC vis-à-vis the executive is captured in an open letter to the president 
written and signed by 24 senior Guardsmen threatening to take action if the “intolerable” 
student demonstrations of the late 1990s were not suppressed.147  In both of these cases, 
there was political friction between the IRGC and the president, but this friction occurred 
outside of government.  Presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami made depoliticization of the 
military, including the Pasdaran and Basij, an administrative priority.  As a result of 
these efforts, IRGC representation in the Iranian polity prior to the 2004 Majlis elections 
was extremely limited.148 
This same degree of antagonism between the military and the executive is not to 
be found in the relationship between the IRGC and current President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad; neither can it be said that the Guards are still political outsiders.  
Statements made by IRGC commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari in a 2007 
speech indicate an evolution of the Pasdaran into a praetorian guardianship for the 
regime.  The Iranian paper Hamshahri quoted the commander saying, “Our enemy has 
changed face. We face the threat of a soft overthrow instead of military invasion, so the 
Guard must also transform accordingly.”149  The allegations of vote-rigging by the IRGC 
and Basij during the 2009 presidential elections accompanied by the brutal suppression of 
popular dissent following the elections lend credence to the idea that another symbiotic 
relationship is emerging between the Guards and the government; this time with the 
presidency. 
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C. “PRIVATIZATION” OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 
According to the current Iranian Constitution, the economic activity in the Islamic 
Republic is to be divided between three sectors: public, cooperative, and private.  Article 
44 defines the scope of state activity as, “all large-scale and mother industries, foreign 
trade, major minerals, banking, insurance, power generation, dams and large-scale 
irrigation networks, radio and television, post, telegraph and telephone services, 
aviation, shipping, roads, railroads and the like.”150  The cooperative sector entails, 
“production and distribution, in urban and rural areas, in accordance with Islamic 
criteria.”151  “The private sector is the most limited in its definition, focusing on, 
“agriculture, animal husbandry, industry, trade, and services that supplement the 
economic activities of the state and cooperative sectors.”152  These categorical divisions 
in the economy and approach to economic development would not survive the three 
decades of the theocratic government.  Today, the Iran has effectively abrogated from 
Article 44, allowing much greater latitude in terms of foreign participation and private 
sector activity in the economy.   
1. Foreign Outreach 
The previous chapter discussed how the late 1980s through the 1990s marked a 
period of change for Iran, wherein revolutionary zeal gradually gave way to a more 
pragmatic approach to conducting the business of the state.  The system of economic 
regulations has not been immune to this internal push towards liberalization.  Despite the 
constitutional mandate granting the predominant stake in the Iranian economy to the state 
sector, privatization in the ownership and management of state-run industries is quickly 
becoming the new direction for Iranian economic policy.  Privatization reform is 
occurring in concert with government attempts to make Iran more attractive to foreign 
investment.  Passage of the 2002 Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act 
(FIPPA) opened new channels for FDI into Iran by allowing foreign investment in major 
                                                 




infrastructure projects, streamlining investment licensing, further privatizing Iranian 
banking and financial sector, elimination of nontariff based trade barriers and the 
establishment of a 25 percent flat tax with exemptions for manufacturing enterprises.153  
More recently, the Majlis is considering a proposal from Iran’s Security and Exchange 
Organization that would eliminate the practice of blocking foreign invested capital for a 
three-year period and the increase the limit on shares that can be held by foreigners to 
20–25 percent.154 
Luring foreign capital into Iran is an important aspect of Iran’s current economic 
reforms, but it is not the sole concern.  Policy makers are also touting a deepening of 
Iranian integration into the global economy as both another means to bolster the Iranian 
economy and as a desired end state for the economic reform agenda.  One large concrete 
move towards globalizing the economy is through membership in the World Trade 
Organization.  Iran submitted an application to begin the WTO membership process on 
19 July 1996, though currently remains only a third of the way through the process.155  
Economic reforms are typically required prior to joining the WTO and Iran is no 
exception; Supreme Leader Khamenei attributes the impetus for much of the economic 
liberalization occurring within to its ongoing bid for WTO membership.156  
Formalization of Iranian economic liberalization began in earnest under Iran’s 
Third Economic, Social, and Cultural Development Plan, expanded under the Fourth 
Development Plan and continues under legislation introduced by the Special Article 44 
Committee of the Majlis and other affiliated legislative organizations.157  The Third 
Development Plan called for the establishment of the Iranian Privatization Organization 
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(IPO) under the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance.  IPO, as the name implies, is 
the organization responsible for the mechanics for the privatization of select state 
enterprises; serving as a clearing house for the divestment and sale of governmental 
company shares to the private and cooperatives sectors of the economy.158 
In 2006, Supreme Leader Khamenei issued an executive order calling for the 
privatization of 80 percent of all state-owned companies over a ten-year course in order 
to, “bring about economic development, social justice and the elimination of poverty.”159  
If fully enacted, the sale of state-owned assets will amount to a figure between $110 and 
$120 billion over the ten-year period.160  The 20 percent of current government holdings 
set to be retained by the government include the National Iranian Oil Company and all 
upstream oil production, the primary source of funding for the state’s bloated subsidy 
system, as well as several key financial institutions, the Central Bank of Iran, Bank Melli 
of Iran, Sepah Bank of Iran, Bank of Industry and Mines, Bank of Agriculture, Housing 
Bank (Bank Maskan) and the Export Development Bank of Iran.161    
2. The Uncertainty of Sanctions 
The history of setbacks in the implementation of the privatization scheme, opacity 
in book keeping and financial records, and complicated arrangement of formal and 
informal power sharing in the Iranian Government have deterred the interests of some of 
the global pool of investors from investing in Iran.  The imposition of sanctions has 
added another layer of uncertainty in Iran’s privatization efforts.162  The introduction of 
targeted sanctions against the IRGC and IRGC affiliated companies means that investing 
in the privatization of profitable state-run company carries a potential for exposure to 
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sanctions, effectively dangling the sword of Damocles over the Iranian economy.  With 
the myriad Pasdaran front companies (currently estimated at more than 800) and the 
expansive reach of the IRGC into the Iranian economy, it does not require a large 
associative leap to expect that this exposure acts as an additional factor to dissuade 
foreign investment in Iran and its privatization program.  Recalling the quote from 
former-Secretary Paulson at the beginning of this chapter, these words, taken in the 
context of the 2007 U.S. unilateral and multilateral (via the United Nations Security 
Council) sanction efforts, could be construed as a veiled threat against foreign investment 
in Iran.   Will Hadfield of the Middle East Economic Digest reaches a similar conclusion, 
anticipating that after the 2007 round of sanctions, “the possibility of Revolutionary 
Guards being among the local shareholders will probably deter most companies from 
investing in Iran.”163 
If the previous argument holds true, then the Iranian government must choose 
whether or not to limit this negative economic effect by constraining or prohibiting the 
participation of the IRGC and its affiliates in future privatization efforts.  On the other 
hand, given the current state of affairs within Iran as well as the growing political and 
economic power of the Pasdaran, this choice may be entirely illusory.  The rationale 
behind this assertion is based on the relative independence of the IRGC from the whole 
of the Iranian government and the dependence of the executives, the Supreme Leader and 
the president, on IRGC support.  The relationship between the current president and the 
Guards was explored in the previous section on politicization and the relationship 
between the Supreme Leader and the Guards is explored below.   
It is important to note here that the formal power structure of the government does 
not reflect the directness of the relationship between the Supreme Leader and the IRGC.  
Indeed, the formal chain of command flows from the Supreme Leader, the 
constitutionally appointed Commander-in-Chief, through the Supreme National Security 
Council to the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics to the Joint Armed 
Forces General Staff to the Pasdaran.  However, the true nature of power sharing in the 
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Islamic Republic is seldom, if ever, completely captured through an examination of the 
formal structure; the case of the IRGC is no exception.  The RAND monograph The Rise 
of the Pasdaran dedicates several pages to discussion of how informal power networks 
“transcend, and in some cases supplant, the official bureaucratic structures-and much of 
their relative power may reside in their access and proximity to the Supreme Leader.”164  
Taken in consideration with the previous discussion of the tenuous legitimacy of 
Khamenei, it is fair to characterize the current state of the evolving relationship between 
the Supreme Leader and the Pasdaran as one that is symbiotic in nature, wherein the 
IRGC augments the authority of Khamenei in exchange for relative autonomy in the 
conduct of their economic affairs. 
Returning to the discussion of why the government would not simply avert the 
negative effects of IRGC involvement in privatization by prohibiting their participation, it 
should now be apparent that neither the IPO, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Finance, or the Majlis have the necessary resources or oversight to prevent the IRGC 
from participating in the privatization process.  The mutual dependency between the 
IRGC and the Iranian executives (Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad) 
prevents these institutions from clamping down on Pasdaran activity through formal 
channels.  In addition, the diversity and opacity of current IRGC assets effectively 
prevents an indirect prohibition by screening all of the IRGC affiliate companies from the 
process.  Therefore, as long as profitable state-run companies continue to go to market for 
privatization, it is almost a certainty that the IRGC will be represented in the pool of 
potential buyers.   
According to the Strategic Majlis Research Center, 68.5 percent of privatization 
sales have gone to the public nonstate sector.165  As evidence to its interest in privatized 
companies, the IRGC, through its affiliated bonyads, banks, and investment consortiums, 
has made several significant purchases.  On September 27, 2009, in a transaction branded 
“noncompetitive” by one Majlis MP, the Etemad Mobin Development Company 
purchased 50 percent plus one of the shares of the Telecommunications Company of Iran 
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(TCI).166  Etemad Mobin Development Company is a private consortium is linked to the 
IRGC.  The purchase of the majority stake in TCI was valued at approximately $7.8 
billion and represented the largest trade in the history of the Tehran Stock Exchange.167  
Another sizable sale involved the floating of a 20 per cent stake in the National Iranian 
Copper Industries Company worth $1.1 billion.168  The NICIC sale was placed under 
parliamentary review after it was alleged in government opposition media that all of the 
principal buyers involved in the deal maintained a strong association with the Basij 
militia.   
The cumulative effect of this argument is represented in the supply and demand 
curves in Figure 5 and will be explained further this section. The IRGC, due to its 
political connections and nebulous nature, is unlikely to be effectively restricted from 
participating in the Iranian privatization program.  Sanctions and, more importantly, the 
threat of future sanctions, mean that the risk that the IRGC will be represented on the list 
of shareholders for a newly privatized Iranian company will dissuade many foreign 
investors from participating in the market.  Hence, the pool of potential investors 
becomes limited primarily to domestic investment.  Ali Larijani, current Chairman of the 
Majlis, pointed out in his criticism of the privatization program that there was not a 
“genuine private sector” in Iran to absorb these sales.169  Indeed, cash-strapped private 
investors in Iran lack the liquidity to generate a demand commensurate with global 
market competition, D1, or the intrinsic value of the companies in the market; this shift in 
demand is illustrated in the diagram with ∆D.170  The supply of companies for sale, being 
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dictated by political policy rather than market demand signals, remains fairly inelastic 
and is illustrated by an almost vertical line, S.  The inelasticity of the supply makes the 
equilibrium price almost an exclusive function of demand.  Therefore, a drop in demand, 
such as the drop triggered by the sanctions regime, will result in a drop in equilibrium 
price of the privatized companies, ∆P.  Cash-rich domestic entities, like the Pasdaran, are 
then able to purchase shares of the newly privatized companies at the new discounted 
price, P2.  Hence, sanctions impose a negative pecuniary externality on the privatization 
efforts.  This externality directly benefits the IRGC by lowering the associated costs of 
acquiring privatized businesses.   
 
 
Figure 5.   Supply and Demand in Iranian Privatization Markets 
3. Financial Estrangement 
The previous section introduced the idea that the Iranian economy is currently 
suffering from a lack of liquidity and foreign currency reserves.  The underlying reason 
for these shortages is largely the result of U.S. unilateral and multilateral sanction efforts.  
• Discounted Price, P2 
Demand Shift, ∆D • Equilibrium Price, P1 
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In 2004, Keba Keinde, the head of corporate finance for the Middle East and North 
Africa at BNP Paribas in Paris described Iran as, “a land of opportunity for banks.”'171  
Six years later the “opportunity” represented by Iran and its population of 72 million 
people does not seem to be so readily apparent to the international finance community.  
In February of 2010, the U.S. Treasury Department reported that more than 80 foreign 
financial institutions have terminated or reduced their business with Iran despite not 
being legally bound to comply with U.S. sanctions.172  Current U.S. Treasury Secretary 
Paulson characterizes Iran’s growing isolation from financial markets as being the result 
of the moral turpitude of the republic: 
As awareness of Iran's deceptive behavior has grown, many banks around 
the world have decided as a matter of prudence and integrity that Iran's 
business is simply not worth the risk. It is plain and simple: reputable 
institutions do not want to be the bankers for this dangerous regime. We 
will continue to work with our international partners to prevent Iran from 
abusing the international financial system to advance its illicit conduct.173 
However, this financial flight from the Islamic Republic is more likely due to 
ongoing pressure from the office of Stuart Levey, current U.S. Under Secretary for 
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence and architect of much of the contemporary U.S. 
sanctions policy, than the ethical implications of doing business in Iran.174  In the 
calculus of most financial institutions, the potential loss of access to U.S. financial 
markets outweighs any of the potential benefits offered by doing business inside Iran.  
The heft behind this threat of exclusion from the U.S. financial market is derived 
primarily from two instruments, Executive Order 13382 and the Comprehensive Iran 
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (H.R. 2194). 
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a. Executive Order 13382 
On 28 June 2005, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 
13382.  E.O. 13382 drew on two previous WMD related executive orders, E.O. 12938 
(1994) and E.O. 13094 (1998), to designate entities as being complicit in WMD 
proliferation activity.  Once designated as a party to WMD proliferation, the Order 
prohibits all transactions between those designees and any U.S. person and freezes all 
assets of the designees possess that are subject to U.S. jurisdiction.  While E.O. 13382 is 
aimed at proliferation in general, Iran-related sanctions make up over 140 cases since 
2005 and outnumber the combined caseloads of three remaining categories (North Korea, 
Syria, and the A.Q. Khan network).175  In addition to the sanctioning the IRGC, itself, as 
well as Ghorb and several of its subsidiaries the Furthermore, this Executive Order 
authorized the Departments of States and Treasury to designate additional WMD 
proliferators and supporters, expediting the sanctioning process and the threat that doing 
business in Iran could represent.    
b. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
Act of 2010 (H.R. 2194) 
H.R. 2194 further expanded the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), the current 
version of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 that removed Libya from the law in 2003 
following rapprochement with the United States.  H.R. 2194 includes several key 
components with respect to the Iranian financial market.  First, Title I expands the ledger 
of secondary sanctions from six to nine; adding a prohibition on access to foreign 
exchange in the United States, a prohibition on access to the U.S. banking system, and a 
prohibition on property transactions in the United States.  Second, Title I also directs the 
Secretary of the Treasury to prohibit U.S. banks from opening or maintaining 
correspondent accounts for any foreign financial institutions facilitating transactions for 
the IRGC.  The same measures apply to any Iranian financial institutions designated as 
supporting the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction or supporting of terrorism 
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under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).176  Third, Title II 
allows state and local government as well as private asset management entities to divest 
from businesses conducting operations in the Iranian energy sector.   
D. CONCLUSION 
This period of time was witness to a renewed government effort to reduce the size 
of the public sector through the selling assets to the private and cooperative sectors.  
Supreme Leader Khamenei defined the ambitiousness of the privatization effort in a 2006 
executive order that called for privatizing 80 percent of the government’s economic 
holdings.  In an effort to maximize the potential returns from the privatization process, 
Iran turned to courting foreign investors.  To make Iran more attractive to foreign capital 
the Majlis introduced measures that restructured the framework regulating foreign 
ownership, including the landmark Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of 
2002.   
The study of sanctions on Iran following the 2005 presidential election can be 
characterized by the fourth hypothesis, sanctions increase risk exposure that inhibits 
foreign competition.  The new smart sanctions regime changed the dynamics of previous 
iterations by introducing a credible (i.e., frequently applied, extraterritorial threat against 
any foreign firm doing business in Iran).  Sanction violators faced a wide range of 
penalties including separation from U.S. financial and commercial markets. Inhibiting 
foreign competition is particularly beneficial to the IRGC given the ongoing changes to 
the character of the Iranian economy.  Reducing the amount of capital and investment 
flowing into Iran gives the relatively cash-rich IRGC a much better position to participate 
in the Iranian privatization market. 
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V. SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND EXPANSION 
A. SUMMARY 
This thesis has endeavored to show how sanctions have played a role in the 
continuing militarization of Iran.  In presenting its case, this thesis has incorporated 
several significant factors from the myriad that have shaped economic and political 
decisions in both Iran and the United States.  The inclusion of narrative context along 
with the body of sanctions was intended to develop the idea that the militarization of Iran 
and the mutable regime of U.S. sanctions maintain a complicated, but well-established, 
relationship.  In fairness to the analysis, this relationship cannot be stripped away from its 
context and distilled in order to satisfy the definitions for the comparative conditions of 
necessity and sufficiency.  The economic, political, and social conditions within Iran are 
unique and should be treated accordingly. Within Iran, however, the effects of these 
sanctions can be generalized into three basic categories, referred to in this summary as 
“gaps.” 
1. The Defense Gap  
The student-led takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran and subsequent 
hostage crisis severed the already chilly relations between Ayatollah Khomeini and the 
Carter administration.  In response the United States froze all Iranian assets subject to 
U.S. control and brought all finance and commerce between the two states to an abrupt 
end.  Among the various sectors affected by the Carter era sanctions, few experienced 
greater impact than the Iranian defense industry.  The main Iranian defense conglomerate, 
Military Industries Organization, was built largely through its multiple partnerships with 
firms in the American defense industry.  A look at the Iranian order of battle for the 
1970s and 1980s reflects this dependency on American military hardware.  The United 
States essentially lifted its sanctions regime after President Carter lost his 1981 reelection 
bid for the White House and Ayatollah Khomeini released the American hostages.  
Diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States, however, remained strained.  
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President Reagan upheld prima facie the previous administration’s policy of keeping U.S. 
weapons and weapon technology out of the Islamic Republic.  The need for war materiel 
inside Iran became amplified by the outbreak of a war with neighboring Iraq.  The United 
States eventually sided with Iraq and established a formal arms embargo against Iran.  
Operation Staunch widened the gap in the supply of weapons systems and crucial spare 
parts that had begun with the exodus of American defense firms following Executive 
Order 12205.   
The defense gap exacerbated the Islamic Republic’s materiel disadvantage against 
its opponent Iraq, but benefitted the IRGC in two ways.  First, because the Pasdaran 
occupied a prominent position (in terms of battlefield presence and leadership) towards 
the end of the Iran-Iraq War, they were in a prime position to shoulder public 
disappointment over the outcome of the war.  The deficiency in materiel brought about 
by an embargo from the “Great Satan” gave Ayatollah Khomeini an alternative target to 
deflect criticism.  Second, despite the loss of Iran’s main defense supply chain, Iranian 
defense expenditure soared to new heights over the course of the war.  A substantial 
portion of this expenditure went into the development of a more broadly capable 
domestic defense industry.  At the end of the war the IRGC’s relationship with the new 
Defense Industries Organization gave the Guards access to construction equipment and 
industrial manufacturing capacity at a time when the general economy of Iran was in 
tatters. 
2. The Foreign Goods and Services Gap  
The post-war period in Iran was host to important changes within the theocracy.  
The populism that gave rise to Ayatollah Khomeini and the Guardianship of the Islamic 
Jurists was replaced by a more pragmatic system of clientelism under Ayatollah 
Khamenei.  Presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami both embarked on a program to promote 
the cautious introduction of liberal reform in the Islamic Republic.  Among the various 
reforms enacted under Rafsanjani was an initiative to curb public spending and balance 
the Iranian budget.  The government was able to trim expenditure, in part, through the  
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institution of a new policy that freed government organizations to generate their own 
streams of revenue.  One of the outcomes of this new policy was the establishment of the 
Pasdaran engineering conglomerate, Ghorb. 
Prior to the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, U.S. sanction efforts directed 
abroad were focused on keeping the flow of weapons and weapon technology out of Iran.  
ILSA changed the paradigm, expanding the reach of sanctions to include foreign 
companies (to Iran and the United States) investing in the underperforming Iranian 
energy sector.  Ghorb would continue to grow throughout the 1990s aided by the absence 
of U.S. competition and reduced foreign competition.  Ghorb revenues would explode in 
the latter half of the following decade as the United States, made wary by Iranian nuclear 
ambitions, ratcheted efforts to dissuade foreign firms from developing the Iranian energy 
sector.  The exodus of foreign companies from 2007 to the present created a void for the 
politically connected IRGC to exploit to the tune of billions of dollars in state contracts.    
Additionally, E.O. 12938, 12959, and 13059 criminalized exporting all American-
made goods and many foreign-made “dual-use” goods to Iran.  In response, the flow of 
most of these sanctioned goods simply shifted from commercial shipping to transnational 
smuggling channels.  The IRGC benefits from this shift as it is widely accepted that the 
organization is intimately involved with most of the smuggling activity occurring within 
Iran.  Revenues derived from the last two decades of smuggling have combined with 
revenues from “legitimate” commercial activity to ensure the coffers of the IRGC’s 
financial network are flush with capital.  
3. The Finance Gap 
A decade after ILSA opened the door to extraterritorial sanctions, the scope of the 
U.S. sanction efforts expanded again; this time to include Iranian access to foreign 
finance.  Diplomatic demarches, Executive Order 13322, The Comprehensive Iran 
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2009, and the Comprehensive Iran 
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 attempt to constrain Iranian 
access to foreign capital flows as a means to deter further development of the Iranian 
nuclear weapons program and punish the state’s ongoing human rights abuse.  This thesis 
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proposes that such capital constraints are beneficial to the IRGC as it limits the pool of 
investors participating in Iran’s ongoing efforts to privatize 80 percent of its massive 
public sector.   
Targeted sanctions add an additional layer of uncertainty to investing in Iran that 
dissuades foreign investors from direct investment in Iran or supplying capital to cash-
strapped Iranian investors.  Targeted sanctions against the IRGC and its affiliates and 
secondary sanctions against foreign firms investing in IRGC affiliates significantly 
reduce the appeal of investing in any company with the potential for IRGC shareholder 
representation.  While the Iranian government has enacted several measures over the last 
decade to lure foreign investment, the IRGC commands sufficient political power and 
economic resources to prevent its exclusion from the privatization process.  Furthermore, 
the IRGC, due to its revenue streams from its licit economic activities and black market 
profits, possesses greater liquidity than other domestic actors.  Therefore, the Pasdaran is 
likely to be well represented in current and future sales of profitable and undervalued 
public firms.  As the role of the Pasdaran in privatization sales expands, the role of 
foreign investment and foreign financed domestic investment decreases, this reduces 
competition and equilibrium prices alike.  Hence, with the influence of sanctions in 
effect, the more the IRGC participates in the Tehran Stock Exchange, the better the 
bargain they receive. 
B. IMPLICATIONS 
One of the implications of this thesis is that it creates an apparent contradiction in 
U.S. foreign policy.  As the previous chapters have shown, a principle desired end state 
underlying all of U.S.-Iranian sanctions since the middle of the 1990s has been Iran’s 
abandonment of its nuclear program.  The IRGC is accepted by the United States and the 
IAEA as the primary agency responsible for the development of the nuclear program.  To 
confront Iran’s nuclear intransigence the United States has opted for a policy of targeted 
sanctions against entities affiliated with the IRGC.  These sanctions were implemented to 
serve as a deterrent for the organization and encourage the Pasdaran to discontinue its 
role in the alleged nuclear weapons program.  However, the position of this thesis is that 
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sanctions have supported the growth of Pasdaran economic and political power.  It is 
reasonable to assume that the senior leadership within the IRGC would welcome greater 
success in penetrating the Iranian economy.  Hence, with the current sanctions in place 
there is little immediate incentive for the IRGC to abandon the nuclear program.   
Sanctions, including both general and targeted, have worked to varying degrees to 
keep Iran isolated from the global economy.  However, the Pasdaran, due to the mafia-
like nature of their economic network, are generally positioned to benefit more from a 
closed domestic economy than from an open globalized economy.177  Stuart Levey, U.S. 
Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, confirms that 
sanctions are expanding the role of the IRGC in the Iranian economy in his own 
assessment of “conduct-based” sanctions.178 The Under Secretary’s remarks then attempt 
to reconcile the seemingly beneficial nature of sanctions with their underlying intent with 
the claim that a larger IRGC presence makes levying follow-on smart sanctions against 
the IRGC more effective and easier to implement.179  Perhaps, given a sufficiently long 
period, the successive rounds of sanctions approach could work; anticipating that 1) 
IRGC economic expansion, 2) Treasury Department recognition of new IRGC expansion, 
and 3) Crafting and implementation of appropriately targeted sanctions to be serial steps 
in the process with each step requiring a certain period of time in order to properly take 
effect.  However, time vis-à-vis Iranian nuclear development is not a luxury that the 
United States possesses.   
The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on the Iranian nuclear program 
prognosticates with moderate certainty that Iran, “would be technically capable of 
producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010–2015 time frame.”180  
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, in early 2010, Iran announced that its nuclear 
program had breached the 20 percent threshold and produced highly enriched uranium, 
HEU.181  This “highly enriched” classification represents more than an exercise in 
semantics, at 20 percent enrichment the uranium could theoretically be weaponized in a 
fission device; though, practical weapon considerations (i.e., size and weight of the 
weapon) necessitate an enrichment level of greater than 80 percent.182  Additionally, 
continuing the enrichment process to produce weapons-grade uranium reveals a second 
distinction between high and low enriched uranium.  The process to enrich from 20 
percent to 80 percent is faster and technically easier to accomplish than reaching 20 
percent enrichment starting at uranium’s naturally occurring state of 0.7 percent.  Given 
these considerations, it is realistic to conclude that the window of opportunity to deter the 
Iranian nuclear program through a slow-acting sanctions regime has closed.   
The other implication arising from this study of Iran is not nearly as bleak as 
confronting the inevitability of a nuclear-armed Iran.  On the contrary, the militarization 
of Iran may offer some potential benefits for the United States.  The primary benefit 
comes from splitting the economic and political interests of the senior leadership of the 
organization.  In other words, the entrenchment of Pasdaran economic interests and the 
manifestation of Pasdaran political influence could dissuade Iran from future conflict 
with the United States.  As the Wall Street Journal claims, “A few IRGC commanders, 
including some at the top, do not relish a conflict with the U.S. that could destroy their 
business empires…there is no guarantee that, in case of a major war, all parts of the 
IRGC would show the same degree of commitment to the system.”183 
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Time and transparency have constrained the quantity and quality of the 
information utilized in the construction of this thesis.  If the future allows scholars to 
scrutinize past machinations of the government and the Guards in greater resolution, this 
thesis leaves considerable room for later confirmation, expansion, or refutation; the major 
points of that are discussed below.   
1. Transparency 
In terms of transparency, as mentioned in the introduction the factious circles of 
formal and informal power within the Islamic Republic of Iran have made information a 
tightly-controlled commodity.  The free flow of information out of Iran is further 
restricted by the antagonistic relationship between Iran and the United States and the 
effect that relationship produces on the generation of objective and informative media 
coverage on Iran.  Hence, several arguments advanced in this thesis could benefit from 
greater transparency and diligent investigation.  First, a time series of the value of IRGC 
assets, holdings, interests would be invaluable to supporting or refuting this thesis.  
Second, explicit accounting of Iranian defense expenditure throughout the Iran-Iraq War 
period, focusing on the value of MIO/DIO assets at the beginning and ending of the war, 
would provide much greater resolution to the arguments introduced in Chapter II.   
2. Time 
In terms of time, the writing of this thesis is proximate to the implementation of a 
new series of sanctions against Iran.  Although the author does not anticipate a dramatic 
departure from the Pasdaran response to previous sanction efforts (in that the IRGC will 
leverage its considerable economic and political resources to adapt and prosper), it is far 
too early to speculate or reach an understanding of the implications and effects of these 
new sanctions.  Hence, a thorough analysis of the effects of the recent series of “smart” 
sanctions remains open as a topic for future study.  
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3. International Sanctions 
An additional opportunity for expansion of this thesis is incorporation of the 
international body of sanctions into the analysis.  The limits placed in this thesis would 
not allow for thoughtful consideration of additional sanctions regimes beyond that 
imposed by the United States.  This exclusion does not greatly impact the study of U.S. 
sanctions given the predominant position of the United States in the global trade network 
and the fact that U.S. sanctions reflect and generally expand on sanctions imposed by 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions.  However, exploring the implementation 
and ramifications of UNSCR 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929 on Iran’s principle 
trading partners might yield additional information useful for a more complete 
assessment of the effects of Iranian sanctions with respect to the militarization of Iran. 
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APPENDIX OF SANCTIONS 
Date Sanction Author Key Points 
14-Nov-79 E.O. 12170 Carter Blocked all property and interests of 
property of the Government of Iran, 
its instrumentalities and controlled 
entities and the Central Bank of Iran 
that are or become subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States 
  F.R. 50841 (1982), 
44741 (1984), 45901 
(1985), 41067 (1986), 
43549 (1987), 45750 
(1988), 46043 (1989), 
47453 (1990), 57791 
(1991), 48719 (1992), 
58639 (1993), 54785 
(1994), 55651 (1995), 
56107 (1996), 51591 
(1997) 
Reagan,  
Bush (41),  
Clinton 
Continuation of E.O. 12170 
7-Apr-80 E.O. 12205 Carter Prohibited any person subject to 
U.S. jurisdiction from the sale, 
supply, or transfer of any items 
outside of humanitarian aid (medical 
supplies, food, etc.) to any entity 
associated with Iran 
      Prohibited shipment by U.S. 
affiliated transport of items for any 
entity associated with Iran 
      Prohibited shipment of items for any 
entity associated with Iran from the 
United States by Iranian affiliated 
transport  
      Prohibited extending new credit or 
loans; providing new depository 
instruments; advancing favorable 
terms; or allowing transfer of funds, 
property, or interests (outside of 
family remittances) to any entity 
associated with Iran 
      Prohibited any person subject to 
U.S. jurisdiction from engaging in 
new service contracts for Iranian 
industrial projects 
17-Apr-80 E.O. 12211 Carter Added the ban on allowing transfer 
of funds, property, or interests 
(outside of family remittances) to 
any entity associated with Iran to 
E.O. 12205 
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   E.O. 12211 
(continued) 
  Prohibited import of Iranian goods 
or services to the United States other 
than materials for news publication 
      Prohibited any transactions by U.S. 
citizens or permanent residents with 
foreign entity or persons for travel 
to Iran 
      Prohibited payment of any expenses 
within Iran for any U.S. citizen or 
permanent resident other than for 
news-gathering purposes 
      Authorized the Secretary of the 
Treasury to revoke licenses for 
transactions with Iran Air, National 
Iranian Oil Company, and National 
Iranian Gas Company and restrict 
use of U.S. passports for travel to, 
in, through Iran 
      Delegated Presidential powers from 
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 
Revised Statutes, Act of July 3, 
1926, National Emergencies Act, 
and International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act to the 
Secretary of the Treasury pursuant 
to carrying out the Order 
23-Jan-81 E.O. 12276 Carter Authorized the Secretary of the 
Treasury to transfer Iranian assets 
frozen under E.O. 12170 to an 
escrow account managed by the 
Central Bank of Algeria in order to 
ensure the release of 52 U.S. 
diplomats and nationals being held 
hostage in Iran 
23-Jan-81 E.O. 12277 Carter Directed the transfer of Iranian gold 
bullion and similar assets from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
to the Bank of England for transfer 
to Iran 
23-Jan-81 E.O. 12278 Carter Directed the application of 
commercial interest backdated to 14 
November 1979 and transfer of 
Iranian financial assets from all U.S. 
banks to the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York Account at the Bank 
of England or to the original 
banking institution 
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23-Jan-81 E.O. 12280 Carter Directs the transfer of Iranian 
financial assets from all U.S. 
nonbanking institutions to the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Account at the Bank of England 
23-Jan-81 E.O. 12281 Carter Directs the transfer of Iranian 
property, not including funds and 
securities, to authorized Iranian 
agents 
23-Jan-81 E.O. 12282 Carter Revoked all prohibitions contained 
in E.O. 12205 and 12211 and 
Proclamation 4702 (which blocked 
the import of Iranian oil into the 
United States) 
23-Jan-81 E.O. 12283 Carter Released the Government of Iran 
from any indemnity sought in 
response to losses sustained by any 
person subject to U.S. jurisdiction as 
a result of the hostage crisis or 
Iranian Revolution  
23-Jan-81 E.O. 12284 Carter Restricted transfer of property 
belonging to the estate of or close 
family connection to Mohammad 
Reza Pahlavi, former Shah of Iran, 
pending termination of estate 
litigation  
30-Oct-87 E.O. 12613 Reagan Restricted the import of all goods 
and services of Iranian origin to the 
United States, its territories and 
possessions, except news materials 
and petroleum products refined in a 
third country 
14-Nov-94 E.O. 12938 Clinton Prohibited the export of any goods, 
technology, or services 
subject to the Secretary of 
Commerce's export jurisdiction that 
would assist a foreign country in 
acquiring the capability to develop, 
produce, stockpile, deliver, or use 
weapons of mass destruction or their 
means of delivery.  
      Charged the Secretary of State to 
pursue negotiations with foreign 
governments to adopt similar 
measures. 
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   E.O. 12938 
(continued) 
  Prohibited government procurement 
of goods and services from 
individuals who knowingly and 
materially contributed to the efforts 
of any foreign country, project, or 
entity to use, develop, produce, 
stockpile, or otherwise acquire 
chemical or biological weapons 
      For state violators the Order 
eliminated any foreign assistance 
channeled through the state 
agencies, engendered U.S. 
opposition to multilateral 
development bank loans, cut U.S.-
backed credit and financial 
assistance, prohibited the sale of 
arms and export of National-
Security Sensitive Goods and 
Technology, imposed import and 
export restrictions, and denied 
landing rights for carrier-based 
aircraft  
15-Mar-95 E.O. 12957 Clinton Prohibited the entry into or 
performance by a United States 
person, or the approval by a United 
States person of the entry into or 
performance by an entity owned or 
controlled by a United States 
person, of (i) a contract that includes 
overall supervision and management 
responsibility for the development 
of petroleum resources located in 
Iran, or (ii) a guaranty of another 
person's performance under such a 
contract 
   E.O. 12957    Prohibited the entry into or 
performance by a United States 
person, or the approval by a United 
States person of the entry into or 
performance by an entity owned or 
controlled by a United States 
person, of (i) a contract for the 
financing of the development of 
petroleum resources located in Iran, 
or (ii) a guaranty of another person's 
performance under such a contract 
6-May-95 E.O. 12959 Bill 
Clinton 
Prohibited the importation into the 
United States, or the financing of 
such importation, of any goods or 
services of Iranian origin 
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   E.O. 12959 
(continued) 
  Prohibited the re-exportation to Iran, 
the Government of Iran, or to any 
entity owned or controlled by the 
Government of Iran, of any goods or 
technology (including technical data 
or other information) exported from 
the United States, the exportation of 
which to Iran is subject to export 
license application requirements 
under any United States regulations 
      Prohibited any transaction, 
including purchase, sale, 
transportation, swap, financing, or 
brokering transactions, by a United 
States person relating to goods or 
services of Iranian origin or owned 
or controlled by the Government of 
Iran 
      Prohibited any new investment by a 
United States person in Iran or in 
property (including entities) owned 
or controlled by the Government of 
Iran 
19-Aug-97 E.O. 13059 Clinton Consolidated and clarified the 
prohibitions specified in E.O. 12957 
and E.O. 12959 
28-Jun-05 E.O. 13382 Bush (43) Augmented E.O. 12938 with respect 
to the proliferation of WMD and the 
means of delivering them by 
blocking the property of specially 
designated WMD proliferators and 
members of their support networks 
and denying those parties access to 
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